Serbian President: ‘Greater Albania’ project danger for entire region

Published: May 24, 2015

Author: InSerbia Team

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BELGRADE – Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic condemned the creation of the so-called Greater Albania, saying that the project is a real danger for peace and stability of the entire Balkan region and specifically stressing – “no” to Kosovo’s independence and “yes” to continuation of dialogue with Pristina.

Belgrade wants to continue the EU-brokered dialogue with Pristina in order to finally resolve concrete problems the people are facing and contribute to full reconciliation and peaceful coexistence of all citizens of Kosovo, Nikolic said in Saturday’s interview for Italy’s ANSA news agency, on the eve of President Sergio Mattarella’s visit to Belgrade.
He also criticized Pristina for lack of will to fully implement the Brussels agreement and called on European officials to “invest additional efforts to make (Kosovo) Albanians meet what they have signed.”
Nikolic thanked Italy for its strong support to the process of EU integration of Serbia, which he said remains Belgrade’s priority goal.
The Serbian president qualified Serbia-Italy relations as excellent, adding there is always room for their strengthening in the reciprocal field.

The Destabilization of Macedonia? Greater Albania and the Process of “Kosovization”

By Vladislav B. Sotirović

Global Research, May 21, 2015

Region: Europe

Theme: Culture, Society & History, Politics and Religion

The last open armed conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – FYROM (former Socialist Republic of Macedonia as one of six federal republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) is just an expected continuation of constant tensions between the ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian Slavs during the last quarter of century.[i] However, these tensions are time to time transformed into the open armed conflicts of the Albanian extremists, usually coming from Kosovo, with the Macedonian security forces.
The most notable conflict incidents in Macedonia after the Kosovo War in 1998−1999, when the Kosovo Albanians started to export Kosovo revolution to Macedonia, up to 2015 are recorded in 2001 that was ended by the EU/USA sponsored Ohrid Agreement, in 2007 when on November 7^th, Macedonian special police forces liquidated six armed Albanians from the neighboring Kosovo on the Shara Mt. in the North Macedonia – the region known from 1991 as the most nationalistic and separatist Albanian area at the Balkans after Kosovo and in 2008 after the parliamentary elections in June.
In the 2007 case, for instance, police found a large amount of hidden arms and ammunition on one location at the Shara Mt. (brought from Kosovo). The Balkan political analysts  are kin to speculate that what is happening in Macedonia after 1999 is just a continuation of the export of the 1998-99 Kosovo revolution.  1998−1999. It basically means that Macedonia is scheduled by the Kosovo Albanian “revolutionaries” (i.e., by the political leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army−the KLA) to be the next Balkan country which will experience a “Kosovo syndrome” that was successfully finished by the proclamation of the Kosovo independence in February 2008. It is as well as assumed that Montenegro is going to be the third Balkan country infected by the process of Kosovization.
The pre-1991 “Macedonian Question”
Macedonia always was the crossroad of the Balkans having a vital strategic position at the peninsula. The geostrategic importance of Macedonia was probably expressed the best by the German kanzellar Otto von Bismarck: “Those who control the valley of the River Vardar are the masters of the Balkans”.[ii]
A whole historic-geographic territory of Macedonia was formerly part of the Ottoman Empire from 1371 to 1912. Macedonia was the first Yugoslav land to be occupied by the Ottomans and the last one to be liberated from the Ottoman yoke. Before the Ottoman lordship, Macedonia was governed by the Byzantine Empire, Bulgaria and Serbia. A Bulgarian sponsored the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (the IMRO) was established in 1893 in Thessaloniki with the ultimate political goal to include whole Macedonia into Bulgaria. After the Balkans Wars of 1912−1913 a territory of historic-geographic Macedonia was partitioned between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. During WWI Macedonia became a scene of fierce fighting between the Central Powers and the Entente (the Macedonian front). Allied forces landed at Thessaloniki in October 1915 to be soon accompanied with approximately 150.000 Serbian soldiers who escaped from the occupied Serbia. In September 1918 under the French General Franchet d’Esperey, a joint British, French and Serbian army advanced against Bulgaria and soon liberated Serbia.[iii]
After the WWI the Treaty of Neuilly confirmed the Vardar Macedonia as a part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, while the Aegean Macedonia with Thessaloniki remained the Greek and the Pirin Macedonia the Bulgarian. In the 1920s a large population movement transformed the ethnic composition of the population of the historic-geographic Macedonia. The crucial exchange of population occurred after the Treaty of Lausanne as some 350.000 Muslims from Macedonia were exchanged with Turkey by around 1.200.000 ethnic Greeks from Anatolia. In the interwar time a Bulgarian sponsored IMRO terrorism activity increased in the Yugoslav Macedonia seeking to destabilize the country in order to finally annex Macedonia into Bulgaria.[iv] After 1945 the Vardar Macedonia became a socialist republic within the Yugoslav federation with recognized a separate Macedonian nationality, Macedonian language and alphabet which was standardized for the first time in history. Up to 1991 the Yugoslav authorities fostered Macedonian self-identity and nationalism at the expense of the Serb and Bulgarian national interests.[v] Therefore, for the very reason to keep a territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, her Albanian minority was not granted a status of an autonomous province like the Kosovo Albanians in Serbia who had, according to the last Yugoslav constitution in 1974, their own president, government, assembly, police, university and academy of sciences – a state within the state.
The post-1991 “Macedonian Question”
During the violent destruction of ex-Yugoslavia, in November 1991 the Socialist Republic of Macedonia proclaimed independence that was firstly recognized by Bulgaria. However, Bulgaria never recognized a separate Macedonian language and ethnicity as for Bulgarians up to today all Macedonian Slavs are ethnolinguistic Bulgarians.[vi] Of course, when Skopje decided to declare independence,  the Macedonians decided at the same time to deal alone with the Albanian nationalism and separatism in Macedonia without help by the Serbs.
The government in Skopje believed that the West will protect a territorial integrity of Macedonia and therefore yet in 1991 NATO’s troops were invited to be deployed in this newly proclaimed independent state which became internationally recognized in 1993 but with a provisional state’s name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – a unique case in world history. Nevertheless, a new Macedonian constitution, a constitutional state’s name (the Republic of Macedonia) and the state’s symbols created immediately extremely tense and hostile relationships with a neighboring Greece as Skopje developed rival (and unjust) claims to the ethnohistorical heritage of the ancient Macedonians and the Kingdom of Macedonia.[vii] Greece and the FYROM recognized each other five years after the Macedonian official proclamation of independence when Greece lifted economic blockade against the FYROM as well.
However, the crucial challenge to the post-1991 “Macedonian Question” is coming from the ethnic breakdown of the country and historical background of interethnic relations between the Macedonian Slavs and the Macedonian Albanians. The later are the biggest and most nationalistic ethnic minority in the FYROM composing today about 30% of total population. Their number increased during the Kosovo War in 1998−1999, especially during the NATO’s “a prominent example of unauthorized humanitarian intervention”[viii] against Serbia and Montenegro, as the Kosovo Albanians, formally as the refugees, came to Macedonia followed by their compatriots from Albania – a country out of any warfare at that time. Majority of those Albanian “refugees”[ix] in fact never returned back to their homeland. Inter-ethnic tensions between the Macedonian Slavs and the Macedonian Albanians soon became increased due to both worsening economic situation and the uncompromised Albanian nationalism as an effect of the exported “Kosovo syndrome”.
The “Kosovo syndrome”
The export of the Kosovo revolution after 1999 as a direct outcome of the “Kosovo syndrome” to neighboring Macedonia is in direct connection with much serious regional problem of creation of a Greater Albania from 1878 up today. After June 1999 when the NATO’s troops occupied and divided Kosovo into five occupation zones, transforming this region into their colony,[x] West Macedonia became a stronghold for the rebel Albanian terrorist forces which in fact came from Kosovo.
The Macedonian Albanian separatism backed by the KLA paramilitary troops in the area of Tetovo, Kumanovo and Gostivar in the North-West Macedonia became directly encouraged by the fact that neighboring Kosovo Albanians finally succeeded to separate Kosovo from the rest of Serbia with direct NATO’s and EU military and diplomatic support. The same or very similar scenario was drawn now and for the West Macedonia with Skopje as a capital of the Albanian independent state of the Republic of Ilirida – a state proclaimed by the local Albanian nationalists twice after the destruction of ex-Yugoslavia: in 1992 and in September 2014. Of course, an ultimate goal is pan-Albanian unification with Tirana as a capital of a Greater Albania as it was during the WWII. Here it has to be stressed that between Kosovo, West Macedonia and Albania in fact there is no cross-border checking as it is formally controlled by the Albanians themselves, if it is controlled at all. Therefore, in practice a Greater Albania already exists. Furthermore, the traffic connections between Tirana and Prishtina are planned to be radically improved as the Kosovo Albanian government recently agreed with the government of Albania to connect their two capitals with a modern highway probably financially sponsored by the western economies.
Perspectives
The “Macedonian Question” has always been at the heart of Balkan politics and of interest to the Great Powers. Macedonia – the small, landlocked territory of the South Balkans has been contested during the last 150 years by all of its four neighbors – Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. A Socialist Yugoslavia of Josip Broz Tito claimed to have solved the “Macedonian Question” by the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as a part of the Yugoslav Federation from 1945 to 1991. Nonetheless, the destruction of the second Yugoslavia in 1991 reopened the issue of the future of the territory of the Vardar Macedonia – a Serbian-Yugoslav part of a geographic-historic Macedonia given to the Kingdom of Serbia by the Bucharest Peace Treaty on August 10^th, 1913.[xi] A successor “Republic of Macedonia” has been proclaimed as an independent state in November 1991 but it has not received immediately universal international recognition either of its formal political independence or of its state-flag and state-name.
Basically, after 1991 up today there are three main problems in regard to the “Macedonian Question”:

1. Will Macedonian state’s territory be divided between the Slavic Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians (who are 30% of Macedonia’s population)?;
2. Will all members of the international community recognize the name of “Republic of Macedonia” (according to the Macedonian Constitution of 1991) or they will continue to call this country as it is today officially named by the UNO – the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (the FYROM); and
3. Will the FYROM have  territorial claims on other parts of geographic-historic Macedonia included into Greece (the “Aegean Macedonia”) and Bulgaria (the “Pirin Macedonia”) after the Second Balkan War in 1913?

The Macedonian independence from 1991 created an extremely tense relationship with the Greek government, since Macedonia developed rival claims for ethnicity and statehood. This rivalry was epitomized in a dispute about the state’s name, as Greece objected to the use of Macedonia, whose historical heritage it claimed. These two countries eventually recognized each other in 1995, and the Greek economic blockade against Macedonia was lifted.
Nevertheless, the crucial problem in this country is that the ethnic make up of the FYROM continued to change as the Albanian refugees poured in from Kosovo and Albania increasing the size of the Albanian minority de facto to 30%.
Tensions were increased through the worsening economic situation, which escalated as a result of international sanctions and the war against its main trading partner – ex-Yugoslavia. As the situation in Kosovo escalated and war erupted in 1998−1999, Macedonia became an important stronghold for the moderate Albanian opposition from Kosovo, but also for the rebel KLA. Extremely encouraged by the recognition of the Albanian required rights in Kosovo from June 1999 by the West, the Albanian minority in the West Macedonia became more assertive and politically aggressive.
Following violent clashes in 2001 between the Macedonian police forces and the (Kosovo) Albanian rebels, NATO followed the plea of the pro-western Macedonian government and increased its presence in this South Balkan country. A higher scale of a civil war was narrowly avoided in 2001 when the Macedonian parliament in Skopje agreed, but under direct western (EU/US) pressure and blackmailing, great concessions granting linguistic and limited political autonomy to the Albanian minority in Macedonia.
In return, the KLA rebels in Macedonia (under the official name of the Albanian National Army – the ANA) agreed to give up their arms to NATO’s troops – a gesture that was done more for the TV screens as the main guns’ arsenal of the KLA was returned back to Kosovo to be activated in Macedonia once again on May 9−10^th,  2015. This happened regardless of the presence of  NATO’s peace-keeping troops in Macedonia which came in the early 1990s following the plea of the Macedonian government after violent clashes between the Macedonian police and Albanian rebels.
Conclusions
The “Macedonian Question” after the 2001 KLA rebellion in Macedonia primarily was dependent on solving the “Kosovo Question”. In the other words, it was logically expected that in the case of “international” (i.e., the western) recognition of Kosovo and by the west sponsored quasi-independence after February 17^th, 2008, the Albanians from the West FYROM (likely followed by their compatriots from the East Montenegro) will follow a Kosovo example of regional revolution for the sake of getting territorial-national independence with a final aim to be united with a motherland Albania as it was clearly noticed even in 1997 by the late Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova and more recently in May 2015 confirmed by the PM of Albania, Edi Rama.
Now we are witnessing a process of practical realization of the Greater Albania project that was designed for the first time by the Albanian First Prizren League in 1878. Or better to say, we are today dealing with the revival of a Greater Albania created by Mussolini in 1941 – a real state that existed until the end of the WWII. A difference is only that the WWII Greater Albania was sponsored by the western nazifascism while a present-day Greater Albania is backed by the western self-proclaimed liberal democracies.
The present Macedonian government of Nikola Gruevski (PM from 2006 and a leader of the VMRO-DPMNE) which has confronted the KLA, is punished (May 2015)  by US-NATO for two reasons:

1. A Macedonian policy not to introduce sanctions against Russia.
2. A Macedonian wish to join Russia’s sponsored “Turkish Stream” of supplying Europe with the Siberian gas.

As the current Greek government is becoming closer to Russia,  the Kosovization of Macedonia could be used against Greece, as a means to undermine the Greek pro-Russian policy. Namely, a summer holiday tourism is for Greece one of the most important incomes for the national budget per year. As a huge number of the European tourists are coming to Greece by the highway that is crossing Serbia, Macedonia and exactly the Kumanovo area it can be expected that in the case of conflict situation in the FYROM, the tourist industry in Greece will be affected.

1. European tourists travelling by land will have to cross conflict areas in Macedonia.
2. The conflict in Macedonia could spill over into Greece itself and most probably into Serbia.

Finally, the armed KLA rebellion in May 2015 against the state of Macedonia is used as a means to destabilize the government in Skopje in the form of a  Colored Revolution, similar to Belgrade in October 2000. As in  Serbia after October 2000, a new post-revolution Macedonian government sponsored by the West would be instrumental into transforming Macedonia into another client state of the post-Cold War NATO’s World Order. The success of the US-NATO plan very much depends on the role played by Russia.[xii]

Notes

[i] On this issue, see [L. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World, Princeton, 1995].

[ii] M. Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804−1999, New York: Viking, 1999, 156.

[iii] On the Macedonian front, see [G. W. Price, The Story of the Salonika Army, London 1918].

[iv] On the terrorism by IMRO, see [A. Londres, Terror in the Balkans, London, 1935].

[v] On this issue, see [S. E. Palmer, R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, Connecticut, 1971].

[vi] On the question of ethnic background of the Macedonians, see [H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia – Its Races and Their Future, London, 1906; H. Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians?, London, 1995]. On the Bulgarian standpoint, see [Macedonia: Documents and Material, Sofia, 1974].

[vii] On the Greek point of view, see [N. K. Martis, The Falsification of Macedonian History, Athens, 1984]. The fact is that the ancient “Macedonians were located between the Thracians and the Greeks, inhabiting the fertile plains drained by the Vardar and Struma rivers. From antiquity to the present the question has been debated as to whether these early Macedonians were Greeks or barbarians” [L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1958, 18]. However, the Macedonian kings and aristocracy have been the Greeks in language, culture and outlook who were inviting the Greeks of learning from Greek world to their courts. On the Macedonian point of view, see [S. Konechni, V. Georgieva, Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 1998].   

[viii] J. L. Holzgrefe, R. O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge−New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 1. On the legal aspect of the humanitarian intervention, see [Ch. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force. Fully Updated Second Edition, Oxford−New York, Oxford University Press, 2004].

[ix] Majority of the Kosovo Albanian “refugees” during the Kosovo War 1998−1999 were not real refugees as they left their homes under the agreement with the KLA in order to show to the mainstream western mass media how the Serbian government is oppressive against the Kosovo ethnic Albanians.

[x] H. Hofbauer, Eksperiment Kosovo: Povratak kolonijalizma, Beograd: Albatros Plus, 2009.

[xi] В. Ћоровић, Наше победе, Београд: Култура, 1990, 82.

[xii] On the NATO, Balkans and Russia after 1991, see [V. B. Sotirović, “The NATO’s World Order, the Balkans and the Russian National Interest”, International Journal of Politics & Law Research, Vol. 3, № 1, Sciknow Publications Ltd., New York, NY, 2015]

GR editor’s note.  We have made minor edits to this article. Due to staff constraints, we were not in a position to carry out a more cohesive editing of this article. mor edit this article.

Opening of EU chapters "depends solely on Kosovo talks"

The opening of first chapters in Serbia's membership negotiations with the EU depends solely on the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.
Source: Tanjug Friday, May 22, 2015 | 14:15

(Tanjug, file)

This is what Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic said on Friday, asked when the expected opening of the first chapter in these talks.
He noted that he thought "Serbia did most of the work," but that this depended "only on the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina."

"I listened to some politicians who said the opening of chapters depends on actions plan for chapters 23 and 24. I have to say that these people have no idea what they're talking about. This is about the community of Serb municipalities, energy and telecommunications, therefore, dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. There is no other issue and no other condition," said Vucic.

He added that "this is still being talked about and the European Union is appraising whether what has been done in relation to the judiciary, civil defense, municipalities in northern Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the return of Serbs to institutions, is sufficient."

"Everything new that would be done would be shifted to the weight that means the opening of the chapter," Vucic has been quoted as saying by the Tanjug agency.

According to him, "Serbia with its work deserves the opening of chapters," to then "stress that all doors in Europe are open for Serbia," and add that it is "one of the most respected countries in the region and beyond because of its economic reforms."

"European press writes that not only Greece but also some of our neighbors who are in the EU are in trouble, but they do not write that Serbia has a problem because they have a clear insight the Serbian public finances and the budget," said Vucic.

Asked when a Kosovo dialogue round dedicated to the future community of municipalities would be held in Brussels, Vucic said that he was "asked that this happens in the first week of June," but that he would be visiting the United States then, "and make an effort that visit the visit is as brief as possible."

The reason for this, he explained, is that "it seems to him that whenever he leaves there's a hailstorm or a flood."

"That's why I don't make plans for anything longer than two and a half days, even if they invited me New Zealand or Chile - two and a half years and I'm back in the country," said Vucic.

What’s Brewing Along the Bulgarian-Macedonian Border?

© Sputnik/ Dmitriy Vinogradov

Columnists

Andrew Korybko

Bulgaria’s decision to send troops to the Macedonian border raises disturbing questions about its true intentions over the country that it last occupied as recently as World War II.

Bulgaria announced the decision to reinforce its border with Macedonia last week in the aftermath of the Kumanovo terrorist attack, publicly stating that it has to defend itself from possible terrorist infiltration (no matter that Eastern Macedonia has never in its history experienced this problem before) and prepare for the (unlikely) possibility that the 90,000 Bulgarian passport-holders in the country could flee across the border.

© REUTERS/ Ognen Teofilovski

Bulgaria Sends Troops to Border With Macedonia Amid Deadly Clashes

Suspicions about Bulgaria’s intentions were raised from the get-go, but now other developments and statements coming from the country appear to confirm what’s really behind their seemingly mystifying move.

Bulgaria, implicitly supported by the US and EU, is possibly attempting to reassert its de-facto claims over the territory and people of the Republic of Macedonia as a means of further destabilizing the country, sidelining Russia’s Balkan Stream project, and distracting from its own domestic malaise.

Latest Developments

Annexation Talk:

The sending of more troops to the Bulgarian-Macedonian border didn’t occur in a vacuum, as certain domestic forces have been pressing for Sofia to involve itself in its neighbor’s domestic and sovereign affairs. Take for example the Director of the National History Museum, Bozhidar Dimitrov, who provocatively hinted that Bulgaria might be confronted with the choice to re-annex its former Fascist-era conquest if asked to do so by the country’s dual Bulgarian citizens.

It should be noted that his call was made half a week prior to the buildup of Bulgaria’s military presence along the Macedonian border, so it’s feasible that this influential and well-connected academic and cultural personality may have had an impact on that decision.

Additionally, Dimitrov is widely known for his radical anti-Macedonian views, having even gone as far as publishing a book in which he asserts that his country’s internationally recognized neighbor is really part of Greater Bulgaria and that there’s no such thing as Macedonia, Macedonians, or the Macedonian language.

Direct Political Interference:

Concern about Bulgaria’s influence over Macedonia’s domestic crisis hit an alarm bell on Sunday when former Bulgarian Prime Minister and current President of the Party of European Socialists Sergey Stanishev attended the Color Revolution inauguration and revved up the anti-government crowd by speaking in both English and Bulgarian.

During his speech, he neglected to even mention the word “Macedonians”, thereby committing a common racial slight by Bulgarians who refuse to recognize the existence of the ethnicity.  It was all the more startling, however, that he had the gall to do so center-stage as a distinguished guest of the Color Revolutionary ‘opposition’, showing that neither he nor his hosts have the slightest care about the issue that forms the core of the country’s identity.

Lead From Behind:

Finally, it’s also telling that it was Bulgarian Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov who was chosen as the individual to announce the EU’s plans in crafting a unified approach to the Macedonian Crisis. This indicates that Brussels has made a conscientious decision to capitalize off of Bulgaria’s historically nationalist attitude to Macedonia in crowning it as the West’s Lead From Behind proxy.  

People Power or Western Meddling? Macedonia Unrest Reveals Differing Views

Such a designation will likely only embolden Bulgaria and the nationalist forces active in its government and society; a calculated move that now increases pressure on Macedonia from the country’s previously calm and stable eastern border, which, when combined with the pressure coming from Albania, creates a type of political pincer movement against the democratically elected and legitimate government.

History Of Hegemony

Bulgaria has historically attempted to physically dominate Macedonia and erase any reference to the Macedonian ethnic group, and it’s tried doing so three times in the last century:

The Second Balkan War:

Less than one month after the Balkan League of Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece liberated the vast majority of the peninsula from Ottoman control, Bulgaria betrayed its allies and tried to conquer their newly acquired territory on 29 June, 1913.

One of Sofia’s main goals at the time was to push Serbia out of the modern-day territory of the Republic of Macedonia and annex the country to Greater Bulgaria. Although the month-long campaign ultimately failed, Bulgaria didn’t lose an ounce of its expansionist desire, which would soon be rekindled with World War I.

World War I:

© REUTERS/ Marko Djurica

Macedonian Conflict: The Pot of Arab Spring Boils Over the Balkans?

Bulgaria’s insatiable territorial ambitions against Serbia and Greece were the primary reason why it chose to join the Central Powers in World War I. This saw it temporarily succeeding in its quest to occupy Macedonia and forcefully claim it as part of Greater Bulgaria. The historical tragedy that the Macedonians had to endure during this time was lifted only by the war’s end in late 1918, after which it was liberated from Bulgarian control for over the next two decades.

World War II:

History has an odd way of constantly repeating itself in the Balkans, and the last global catastrophe was no different. Bulgaria sided with Nazi Germany partly because it still desired to dominate Macedonia, and right after Hitler defeated Yugoslavia in April 1941, it sent its troops to annex the sought-after territory. The Macedonians proudly resisted and launched their National Liberation War against the occupiers, which continued until all Nazi and Bulgarian soldiers were finally evicted from the land.

Current Context

Bulgaria is currently in pretty poor shape, both economically and politically. It holds the unsavory spot of being the EU’s poorest country, and hundreds of thousands of its citizens live as economic migrants in Western Europe.

Bulgaria’s government is also unstable, regularly undergoing various reshufflings and resignations. The current Prime Minister, Boyko Borissov, returned to office in November of last year and has since then placed his country on a dedicated anti-Russian course.

In fact, it’s because of his and the previous government’s obstinate stance in siding with Brussels and its restrictive Third Energy Package legislation that Russia was forced to cancel the South Stream pipeline and spearhead the Turkish and Balkan Stream projects instead.

Macedonian Conflict: 'Greater Albania' Used by West to Destabilize Balkans

The Bulgarian public is understandably upset that the project was scrapped, since their impoverished country suddenly lost out on billions of dollars of revenue and investment. An exclusively commissioned Sputnik poll revealed that 64% of Bulgarians thought that the move would have a negative effect on their economies, and 66% of them believed that their country, not the European Commission, should have had the final say on whether or not Russia should have been allowed to build the pipeline.

Faced with such a growing revolt to his government’s economically suicidal anti-Russian policies, Borissov felt compelled to safeguard his administration by channeling the public’s growing outrage away from the authorities and towards an external crisis that could easily distract them, ergo Bulgaria’s growingly assertive stance and increasingly vocal nationalism vis-à-vis Macedonia.

It’s likely that Bulgaria’s resurgent nationalism is even encouraged by the West itself, which looks to have promised to turn a blind eye to such loud rhetoric in exchange for the country’s position against South Stream. After all, Brussels didn’t offer any economic relief to compensate for the gargantuan loss of investment that Bulgaria suffered when South Stream was cancelled, so it’s quite possible that distracting intangible benefits such as a carte blanche for nationalist expression were promised instead.

Furthermore, by returning to its role as one of the agitating actors in the Balkans, Bulgaria helps the West achieve one of its key geopolitical objectives in destabilizing Balkan Stream-affiliated Macedonia. The combined threats of Greater Albania and Greater Bulgaria weigh heavily on the Macedonia’s political leadership, which now finds itself between two pseudo-expansionist powers that evidently have a nationalist stake in the multicultural and unified country’s collapse.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of Sputnik.

Read more: http://sputniknews.com/columnists/20150519/1022309940.html#ixzz3akiPLO6l

Αλβανικες Ειδικές Δυνάμεις, σε ενίσχυση των τουριστικών χωριών σε Δραλειο, Χειμάρρας

Φόβος απο των βίαιων αντιδράσεων των λαο της Χιμάρας

Σύμφωνα με πρόσφατες πληροφορίες, η αλβανικη κυβέρνηση θα βοηθήσει τους επενδυτές, οι οποίοι θα χτίσοουναι τουριστικά χωριά στο Δραλειο, ακόμη και με στρατιωτική δύναμη, συμφονα με πλιροφοριες απο Τιρανα..

Για το σκοπό αυτό, το Τμήμα της Αστυνομίας της Χιμάρας, που οφείλεται στη δημιουργία ενός νέου Δήμου της Χιμάρας, θα προσθέσει περίπου 100 αστυνομοί.

Αλλά πηγές λένε ότι περίπου 50 ειδικών αστυνομικών, θα συγκεντρωθούν στο Δραλειο, για να βοηθουναι στην οικοδόμηση τουριστικά χωριά, όπως ο φόβος παραστρατιωτικών εγκεφαλικό επεισόδιο Χειμαρριώτες και της κοινότητας.

Το Αλβανικό κοινοβούλιο σήμερα, στεγάζεται σε ένα αυθαίρετο τρόπο αντίθετο προς το Σύνταγμα της χώρας και το διεθνές δίκαιο των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων, η έγκριση για την κατασκευή τουριστικών χωριών, στη Χιμάρα.

Τα Τίρανα ετοιμάζονται για σύγκρουση με την Ελλάδα για " το θέμα της Χιμάρας"

30/1/15

1283

Η νέα διοικητική διαίρεση σε αντίθεση με την βούληση του πληθυσμού της Χιμάρας ετοιμάζει συγκρούσεις με εθνικές συνέπειες και λόγω της έναρξης των εργασιών για την κατασκευή τουριστικών χωριών που ενέκρινε η Aλβανική κυβέρνηση.

- See more at: http://www.hellas-now.com/2015/01/blog-post_665.html#sthash.RrNF9fKZ.dpuf

Τα Τίρανα ετοιμάζονται για σύγκρουση με την Ελλάδα για " το θέμα της Χιμάρας"

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Η νέα διοικητική διαίρεση σε αντίθεση με την βούληση του πληθυσμού της Χιμάρας ετοιμάζει συγκρούσεις με εθνικές συνέπειες και λόγω της έναρξης των εργασιών για την κατασκευή τουριστικών χωριών που ενέκρινε η Aλβανική κυβέρνηση.

- See more at: http://www.hellas-now.com/2015/01/blog-post_665.html#sthash.RrNF9fKZ.dpuf

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Τα Τίρανα ετοιμάζονται για σύγκρουση με την Ελλάδα για " το θέμα της Χιμάρας"....

SManalysis

Η νέα διοικητική διαίρεση σε αντίθεση με την βούληση του πληθυσμού της Χιμάρας ετοιμάζει συγκρούσεις με εθνικές συνέπειες και λόγω της έναρξης των εργασιών για την κατασκευή τουριστικών χωριών που ενέκρινε η Aλβανική κυβέρνηση.



Ανώτεροι αξιωματούχοι του Αλβανικού κράτους εμπλέκοντε με κατασκευαστικές εταιρείες, ενώ οι νόμοι που ψηφίστηκαν πρόσφατα δίνουν το δικαίωμα στην Aλβανική κυβέρνηση να λάβει αποφάσεις σε αντίθεση με τον Χάρτη της Τοπικής Αυτονομίας, για τον έλεγχο των δημοτικών εδαφών και περιουσιών.

Τα κτήματα όπου θα κατασκευαστούν αυτά τα τουριστικά χωριά δεν έχουν τίτλους ιδιοκτησίας λόγω της ολιγωρίας του ΟΑΣΕ η οποίο δεν ολοκλήρωσε το προγραμα «καταγραφής των τίτλων ιδιοκτησίας στη περιοχή μας», ένα έργο που χρηματοδοτείται από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση που απέτυχε.

Η πειοχή όπου θα κατασκεβαστούν τουλάχιστον δύο τουριστικά χωριά στο Δραλέω υπήρξε στο πρόσφατο παρελθόν η αιτία των εθνοτικών συγκρούσεων μεταξύ της νέας (τότε) Αλβανιακής κυβέρνησης το 1912 και του τοπικού Eλληνικού πληθυσμού με αποτέλεσμα να ξεκίνησε η εξέγερση που έφερε την κήρυξη της αυτονομίας που Βορείου Ηπείρου που αργότερα έφερε την διεθνή αναγνώριση του Πρωτοκόλλου της Κέρκυρας το 1914.


Ενώ τον τοπικό πληθυσμό της Χιμάρας εγκατέλειψε τα χωριά τα Χριστούγενα για να φύγει στην Ελλάδα λόγω τον συχνών διακοπών του ρεβματος, οι εργασίες στο δρόμο του Δραλέω συνεχίζανε με γοργούς ρυθμούς για να άνοιξη αρχίσουν την κατασκεβι την νέων οικιζμών που έχουν αδιοδοτήθη εκη.

Ο δρόμος αυτός μέχρι πρόσφατα εξυπηρετούσε τα λύγα τροχόσπιτα τον ξένων που κατεβενανε στην παραλία του Δραλέω από περιέργια και για μοναξιά, τώρα χτίζετε για να εξυπηρετήσει τα βαρέα οχήματα που θα μεταφέρουν τo σκυρόδεμα και τα οικοδομικά υλικά που θα χρειαστούν για την κατακσεβι τον δύο νέων οικιζμών.

Οι δύο νέοι οικιζμοί, το Palsa Village και το Green Coast Village έχουν συνολική εκτάσει 287.000 τετραγωνικά μέτρα και θα έχουν εκτός από ξενοδοχεία και πάνω από 200 διώροφες βίλες και αμέτρητες πολυκατικιές που θα μπορούν να φιλοξενήσουν ευα μεγόλο πληθιζμό μέχρι 5.000 κατικούς που στην ουσία δύχνη ότι προκεται για απίκια με νεοφερόμενο πληθιζμό που ενώνετε χωρίς την θέληση του τοπικού πληθιζμού με το λαό της Χιμάρας, σαν να μην έφτανε η ένωση με το Βράνηστη χωρίς την θέληση του λαού της Χιμάρας.

Οι αδιές αυτές δόθηκαν με την δικεολογία της ανάπτυξης του τουριζμού αλλά αν κάνουμε μια απλή αναλησα προκύπτη ότι αυτές οι αδιές είνε σε αντιθέσει με το Σύνταγμα της Αλβανίας το οποίο προστατεβή την ιδιωτική περιουσία που στην συγγεκριμένη τοποθεσία ανοίκει σε δεκάδες οικογένιες Χιμαριωτών και θα φέρουν σε συγγρουσι το αφθοκτόνο πληθιζμό της Χιμάρας με της δύο μεγάλες εταιρίες που στηρίζοντε από την Αλβανική Κυβέρνηση.

Και οι δύο ετερίες έχουν επωφεληθή από την κρίση και την διαφθορά που υπάρχει στην Αλβανία στο χώρο της περιουσίας και ηδικα στην περιοχή της Χιμάρας όπου λόγω της απουσίας του κτηματολογίου και χάρη στηνs προηγούμενες δοίκησης του Δημαρχείου έχου καρπωθεί πλαστογραφημένους τίτλους ιδιοκτησίας που αν και έχουν κατανγκέλθει στον εισαγγελέα, έχουν γείνη δεκτά από την Αλβανική κυβέρνηση και πάνω σε αυτά εκδίδουν αδιές.
Η ανάλυση σε φέρνη σε ένα απλό συμπέρασμα: ότι το όλο ενχηρημα θα έχει οδυνηρές συνέπιες για την Αλβανική Κυβέρνηση. Παρά την δραστηριότητα και την προσπάθια της κοινότητας της Χιμάρας στην Διασόρα και της επεβάσεις της Αμερικανικής διπλωματίας και εκπροσώπων του Αμερικανικού Κονγρέσου που αναφέρουν την παραβίαση τον αντροπινών δικεοματων του λαού της Χιμάρας ειδικά στο θέμα της ιδιωτικής και δημοτικής περιουσίαs, η Κυβέρνηση της Αλβανίας φέρετε αποφασιζμένη να προχωρηση στα σχέδια της.

Η Κυβέρνηση της Αλβανία έχει παραβιάσει πολλές φορές το σύνταγμα της Αλβανίας όσον αφορά τα ανθρώπινα δικεοματα του λαού της Χιμάρας. Όπως:
Έχει παραβίαση το Χάρτη των Ηνωμένων Εθνών για της μιονότητες με την άρνηση της να αποκαλύ το λαό της Χιμάρας Ελληνική Εθνική μιονότητα και ως έκτου του έχει αρνηθεί το δικεομα της εκπεδευσης και εκφράσεις της Εθνικής της ταυτότητας.
Έχει παραβιάσει το δικεομα της ιδιοκτησίας και της κληρονομιάς της περιουσίας μέσω της μη εγραφής τον περιουσιών του στο Εθνικό Κτηματολόγιο.
Έχει αρνηθεί το δικεομα της Αυτοδιοίκησης και επιλογής το εκπροσώπων της μέσα της νέας Δοικητικής διερεσις που ενόνη την Χιμάρα με το Βρανιστή.
Έτσι η Κυβέρνηση της Αλβανίας ερχετε σε μετωπική συγγρουσι με το λαό της Χιμάρας για τα Συνταγματικά ανθρώπινα δικεοματα. .

Με αυθέρετο τρόπο και αλαζονία η κυβέρνηση της Αλβανίας, που με βάση ότι λένε τα μέδια που δεν ελέγχει είναι εμπλεγμένη σε ύποπτες συναλαγές με της εταιρίες που αδιοδοτούντε στο Δραλέω, και υπό την επιροή τον νεοολιγαρκων της Αλβανίας, δεν διστάζουν να έρθουν σε συγγρουσι με το λαό της Χιμάρας θέτοντας σε κίνδυνο την σταθερότητα του κράτος και το μελών της Αλβανίας.

Οργανιζμοί και όργανα διεθνούς κύρους όπως ΟΑΣΕ, ΝΑΤΟ και Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση θα πρέπει να επενβουν για να μην αφήσουν αυτή η συμπεριφορά και συγγρουσι να φέρει επικίνδυνες συνέπιες για το μελών στις σχέσης τον δύο χώρων που είναι μελοι του ΝΑΤΟ, Αλβανία και Ελλάδα. 

http://www.hellas-now.com/2015/01/blog-post_665.html 

Antigua and Barbuda recognizes Kosovo

PRISTINA – The Caribbean state of Antigua and Barbuda has recognized the independence of Kosovo, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Kosovo Hashim Thaci confirmed on Wednesday.

Image: Google Maps

“Excellent news! I just received official information that Antigua and Barbuda has recognized Kosovo,” Thaci wrote on his Facebook account, Albanian ATA news agency reported.
“The recognition of Kosovo by international countries and organizations is not stopping,” he added.
The unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo has so far been recognized by 93 out of 193 UN countries.

Soros sees risk of another world war

Much depends on Chinese economy

By

GregRobb

Senior economics reporter

Bloomberg

George Soros said it is “worth trying” to link the U.S. and Chinese economic spheres and reduce the risk of armed conflict.

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — Billionaire investor George Soros said flatly that he’s concerned about the possibility of another world war
Much depends on the health of the Chinese economy, Soros said in remarks at a Bretton Woods conference at the World Bank.
If China’s efforts to transition to a domestic-demand led economy from an export engine falter, there is a “likelihood” that China’s rulers would foster an external conflict to keep the country together and hold on to power.
“If there is conflict between China and a military ally of the United States, like Japan, then it is not an exaggeration to say that we are on the threshold of a third world war,” Soros said.
Military spending is on the rise in Russia and China, he said.
To avoid this scenario, Soros called on the U.S. to make a “major concession” and allow China’s currency to join the International Monetary Fund’s basket of currencies. This would make the yuan a potential rival to the dollar as a global reserve currency.
In return, China would have to make similar major concessions to reform its economy, such as accepting the rule of law, Soros said.
Allowing China’s yuan to be a market currency would create “a binding connection” between the two systems.
An agreement along these lines will be difficult to achieve, Soros said, but the alternative is so unpleasant
“Without it, there is a real danger that China will align itself with Russia politically and militarily, and then the threat of third world war becomes real, so it is worth trying.”

Albania says could block Macedonia's NATO bid amid spat over minority rights

Published May 20, 2015

Associated Press

• 

  Albanian prime minister Edi Rama speaks at a U.S.-sponsored anti-terrorism regional meeting in Albania's capital Tirana, Wednesday, May 20, 2015. Rama warned Macedonia it cannot join the NATO family unless it respects the democratic rights of its ethnic Albanian minority, considering “unacceptable” how Macedonian authorities linked a recent gunbattle between police and a group of armed ethnic Albanian men as a terrorist act from the latter. (AP Photo/Hektor Pustina) (The Associated Press)

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TIRANA, Albania –  Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has warned that his country could block Macedonia's bid to join NATO unless it improves its record on respecting the rights of the country's ethnic Albanian minority.
The tiny republic's accession has already been blocked by neighbor Greece because of a dispute over the republic's name.
Rama gave the warning Wednesday while speaking an anti-terrorism conference in the capital Tirana. Relations between to the two Balkan neighbors have further soured following a shootout in northern Macedonia this month between police and suspected ethnic Albanian militants that left eight officers and 10 others dead.
Macedonia, in one of its deepest political crises since gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, has a sizeable ethnic Albanian minority which has been decisive in forming governing coalitions.

Macedonia Unrest: West Giving Balkan Country a Lesson of 'Democracy'

© REUTERS/ Boris Grdanoski

After Russia's Stroitransgaz announced it will build a gas pipeline across Macedonia, Skopje has come under heavy criticism from Washington, Brussels and numerous US-funded NGOs, which blasted the government for violating "European values."

 

It looks like the West is going to give Macedonia a lesson of "democracy," noted American writer and researcher Michael Collins, drawing a parallel between the current situation in the country and dramatic events which took place in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine.

"The announcement of Russian pipeline deal on March 12 put the small nation in the cross hairs of the Obama administration and Congress. Allowing Russia a backdoor to sell Europe natural gas challenged the economic and political war against Russia. The US and its puppet governments in London, Paris, and Berlin give lip service to free markets. But, when it comes to Russia, political goals trump commerce," the researcher underscored.

© REUTERS/ Ognen Teofilovski

Western Coup Attempt Will Not Succeed in Macedonia

Macedonia's Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski was accused of taking bribes, shortly after the Russo-Macedonian deal had been announced. However, "the press failed to mention that corruption has been a mainstay of Macedonian politics since independence in 1991. Even if true, the charges are just more of the same," Michael Collins highlighted.
As usual, the Western corporate media have launched a large-scale campaign aimed against Macedonian authorities, accompanied by a group of tame American NGOs, which immediately joined the chorus together with Macedonia's opposition figures.

© Sputnik/ Dmitriy Vinogradov

What’s Brewing Along the Bulgarian-Macedonian Border?

Indeed, a well-known US watchdog, the National Endowment for Democracy is spending hundreds of thousands of dollars in Macedonia in order to promote "Civic Engagement in Legislative Advocacy and Public Policy Dialogue," while the George Soros funded Open Society Foundation is carrying out "coordinated actions" aimed at forcing the government "to improve accountability and transparency," the writer noted.

"Like serpents in a swamp, the NGOs lay in wait for any signs of deviation from the projects of the US financial and political elite," the researcher elaborated with unconcealed sarcasm.

Furthermore, Albania's Foreign Ministry has also raised its voice against Skopje, slamming the Macedonian authorities for police brutality towards Albanian extremists, who attacked the police on May 9, 2015 in the city of Kumanovo.

People Power or Western Meddling? Macedonia Unrest Reveals Differing Views

Meanwhile, British media – Western propaganda's "heavy artillery" – reported on May, 17 of "tens of thousands" of protesters in Skopje, who have demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski.

"There's a simple goal for the latest democracy festival in Macedonia. It's the same goal as its recent predecessors in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine," Michael Collins pointed out, "to bring [the country] some serious democracy."

Western elites have sent a clear message to Skopje and to other regimes which demonstrate "disobedience" to Washington and Brussels, saying: "cooperate or else," the writer concluded. 

Read more: http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150520/1022369299.html#ixzz3ahAD1gVa

Stratfor; The Problems Foreign Powers Find in the Balkans

Analysis

May 19, 2015 | 09:00 GMTSerbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic (R) meets his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov when he arrives for a visit to Belgrade. (ANDREJ ISAKOVIC/AFP PHOTO)

Summary

Russia, Turkey and the West all share one rival in the Balkans: political instability. Located at the confluence of three historic empires, the strip of land between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea has long been the focus of competition among global powers. Now it is just one arena in the standoff between Russia and the West. Yet, with both sides attempting to buy influence with investments and energy projects, and with Turkey struggling to keep pace, internal political challenges threaten to undermine outside efforts to develop and shape the region. As major powers use their financial and political clout to gain influence in the Balkans, weak local governments will continue to balance among competing nations.

Analysis

Regional and world powers have paid an inordinate amount of attention to Balkan countries lately. On May 15, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Serbia, just a few days after the Chair of the Russian Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko, met with Serbian leaders in Belgrade. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will visit Bosnia-Herzegovina on May 20 — Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan have paid similar visits in the past month. Western leaders have also demonstrated an interest in the region, with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond visiting Bulgaria in January, while high-ranking U.S. officials regularly visit Romania.

Strategic Investments From the West

Western governments have two major goals in the Balkans: to maintain stability in the western part of the region and to minimize Russian influence. To that end, the United States and the European Union have been involved in the internal politics of the Balkans since NATO committed troops in the aftermath of the Bosnian war and the conflict in Kosovo in the 1990s. Western troops continue to serve in Kosovo in a peacekeeping capacity. The European Union has used considerable amounts of resources and political capital to bring reform and economic development to the region, but with mixed results.

The West has the advantage of access to ample development and defense funds that can be divided out among countries hungry for economic growth. Countries such as Serbia and Macedonia are unlikely to join the European Union in the next decade; they are held back by internal divisions and face resistance from current EU members. Yet they still have access to the economic benefits that come from close ties with Europe. Between 2014 and 2020, the European Union plans to grant 1.5 billion euros (around $1.7 billion) to Serbia, a prospective EU member, and 11.4 billion euros to Bulgaria, a current EU member. (Bulgarian citizens benefit from the ability to travel freely and work in the European Union.) In addition, there is significant defense assistance coming into Bulgaria as part of an effort to strengthen NATO members along the Russian borderlands.

The Ukraine crisis galvanized the United States into boosting defenses along NATO's eastern edge. NATO has enlarged its multinational response force, created a new spearhead force that can mobilize quickly and established a chain of outposts in the eastern Balkans called force integration units, which could serve as command centers during a conflict.
At the same time, fighting in Ukraine prompted the European Union to prioritize its Southern Corridor natural gas project, which would bypass Russian energy giant Gazprom in the European energy market and reduce Europe's reliance on Russia. In addition, the West strongly discouraged Bulgaria from participating in Russia's South Stream project. When Bulgaria opted out, Russia canceled the project in December.

Russia Counters the West

For its part, Russia has used its influence in the Balkans, where it has close historic and cultural ties with countries such as Serbia and Greece, to threaten Western interests. However, the Kremlin's interest in the region in the past year stems in large part from its deteriorating relationship with the West. Russia's goal in the Balkans is to prevent the expansion of Western troops and military infrastructure in the region while maintaining sufficient strength to implement strategic energy infrastructure projects.

Although the West has greater resources to invest in the Balkans, Russia owns several regional energy assets and holds a number of outstanding loans to Balkan governments. Moscow has managed to retain good diplomatic relationships with some local oligarchs, especially in Bulgaria. In 2008, Gazprom bought a majority stake in Serbian oil firm NIS. Like the European Union, Russia has provided funding to Serbia — about $1.5 billion in over the past two years. The Kremlin also sealed energy and loan deals with the Republika Srpska, the ethnic Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Western pressure may have ended the South Stream project, but the pipeline Russia plans to build in its place, Turkish Stream, could help Gazprom counter European energy diversification efforts. The pipeline would bring natural gas across the Black Sea to the Turkey-Greek border. To help Gazprom reach Central European markets, Russia has advocated the construction of a pipeline that would run from Greece to Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary. In addition to Turkey, these four countries are at the center of a Russian diplomatic offensive. Nevertheless, with Russia struggling to manage internal financial and political challenges, its leverage in the Balkans is relatively limited.

Turkish Interests

Turkey has its own cultural links and economic interests in the Balkans, but it currently lacks the resources and military power to rival Russia or the West.
One of Turkey's strategic objectives is to maintain influence in the Black Sea. Historically, Ankara has achieved this by anchoring itself on the Danube. By extension, this objective entails managing relations with other Black Sea states in the Balkans. But Turkey is also attempting to grow closer to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Ankara means to enhance its influence through cultural and historical ties. These connections are important: Muslim Bosniaks started migrating to Turkey in the 17th century, and a few million Turkish citizens claim Bosniak roots today. This ethnic affinity has prompted popular government initiatives to invest in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Turkey cannot match the level of financial investment Western powers and Russia commit to the Balkans. But as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea and as a NATO member, Turkey plays a significant role in Bulgarian and Romanian efforts to boost defense cooperation in response to the crisis in Ukraine. Moreover, Turkey has been able to use financial and political tools to curry favor with Bosnia. Turkey is among the top five investors in the country. In fact, Turkish officials claim that Turkey has invested $1.1 billion in Bosnia since 1995 — a significant sum for a country with a gross domestic product of about $18 billion.  
The Turkish Stream pipeline, if built, would no doubt empower Turkey. Ankara would play a central role in its construction, and it would use that role to improve its relationships with countries that would receive Turkish Stream natural gas, including Macedonia and Serbia.

Violence in Macedonia

Despite the attention they command from larger powers, the Balkans are often unstable, and their instability can impede the influence of foreign powers. For example, deadly violence erupted in Macedonia on May 9, when Interior Ministry personnel cracked down on alleged ethnic Albanian militants in Kumanovo, culminating in the death of eight police officers and 14 alleged militants. Nearly 40 policemen were injured and 30 militants were arrested. There are also unconfirmed reports of civilian casualties.

The Macedonian government argued that its operation in the town was to prevent militants from carrying out planned terror attacks inside the country. However, the timing of the operation led many to believe the crackdown was politically motivated — a distraction that could divert attention from a recently discovered illegal government wiretapping program.
The bloodshed in Kumanovo, coupled with revelations of the illegal acquisition of information of citizens, further undermines the credibility of a government that is already distrusted by its people. On May 17, tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Macedonia's capital city, Skopje. Western-sponsored talks the following day failed to bring about a compromise between the government and opposition parties, and the government's hold on power remains tenuous.

Russia is counting on running its extension of Turkish Stream through Macedonia into Central Europe, but the country's instability threatens to derail these plans at a time when countries along alternative routes are not receptive to Russian proposals. The incumbent Bulgarian government, under pressure from the United States and the European Union, is opposed to participation in a Russia-led energy project, while Albania retains a pro-Western foreign policy orientation.
With so much at stake, the Russian Foreign Ministry came out forcefully in support of the Macedonian government in response to the protests. The ministry criticized opposition parties and non-governmental groups alike, accusing them of being in league with Western powers and choosing to follow a chaotic "color revolution" ideology. Macedonia's incumbent government is nominally in favor of NATO and EU accession but has been open to Russia's Turkish Stream proposals. A weak government, as well as growing instability in Macedonia, is preventing the country from becoming a staunch Western ally or a reliable partner for Russia.

A Broader Regional Challenge

Clashes in Macedonia raise the specter of renewed ethnic tension and violence in the Balkans, where political borders do not coincide with ethnic boundaries. Though recent violence probably will not spill over into nearby countries in the immediate future, Macedonia's problems are a concern in the region. Serbia raised its combat alert status, and Bulgaria sent troops to reinforce the border.
Since 1999, Western governments have worked to stabilize Kosovo and the surrounding area through the presence of peacekeepers and large-scale development programs. Brussels is also pressuring Serbia to normalize relations with Kosovo as a precondition for EU accession. A potential increase in militancy along the Kosovo-Macedonia border would threaten this stability and undermine the West's long-standing efforts in the region.

Ultimately, no matter how much time and external political power is invested in the Balkans, success depends on the presence of strong, stable governance. But Balkan governments are notoriously weak. In Bulgaria, social unrest in 2013 forced the government to resign. Since then, the country has gone through several weak, short-lived governments that have been beset by internal disputes. Meanwhile in Bosnia-Herzegovina, political paralysis has prevented the introduction of much-needed economic and political reform. Protests over corruption in 2014 highlighted the Bosnian political system's inability to address the country's inherent problems.

The tumult of Balkan politics enables foreign powers to make certain inroads, boosting their influence through financial and political support for local governments. But the fragility of Balkan states prevents them from swinging decisively toward one outside power. Like other nations in Europe's borderlands, many of the Balkan countries have attempted to retain a degree of neutrality. A balancing strategy means that Balkan governments can access advantageous economic agreements, financial assistance packages and political support from multiple external powers.

Geopolitical rivalries and local disputes in the region have historically formed an explosive combination, fueling military conflicts like World War I as well as numerous Balkan armed struggles. Today, a more nuanced competition is taking place as foreign powers use economic influence, defense cooperation, and political support to further their goals in the region.
The conflict in Macedonia — and the potential it has to upset Russia's plans in the region — embodies the problems foreign powers find in the Balkans. While the West, Russia and Turkey are all eager to pump capital into the region for their own betterment, weak governments will continue balancing among outside powers.