But recent reports by a variety of sources indicate renewed interest by Russian
submarine forces in surveillance
of those cables, including detailed monitoring and targeting of the
system. The tactical reasons for doing so are plain: in the case of
heightened tensions, access to the underwater cable system represents a
rich trove of intelligence, a potential major disruption to an enemy's
economy and a symbolic chest thump for the Russian Navy.
Placing
the submarine activity in the larger context of Russian geopolitical
strategy, it is possible to see the broader rationale for these moves at
this moment. First, such actions play well to a domestic Russian
audience that wants to see Russia as the global counter-weight to the
U.S. Russian President Vladimir Putin above all else craves respect, and
his actions -- from invading Georgia to annexing Crimea to muscling
into Syria on the side of the reprehensible Assad regime to active
surveillance -- enhance his international importance and profile.
The movement of information is the lifeblood of the global economic system: it needs to be more secure from accident and attack.
Second,
these types of high tech, delicate and complex undersea maneuvers
constitute important training and preparation for the Russian Navy. The
ability to tap these
cables for intelligence
as well as attack them with precision is a skill-based activity that
requires detailed knowledge and real precision work at depth according
to many reports. Practice is vital.
Additionally, the underwater maneuvers are a signal to the U.S. and its allies, much like the other recent
aggressive international moves coming from Moscow. Russia is reaching for many other Cold War tools as well, including aggressive long-range
bomber patrols above NATO nations (particularly the Baltic states) and building up significant military capability in the Arctic.
Are we headed back to another Cold War? Probably not, despite the
ominous range of activities. We should remember that we still cooperate
with Russian on a wide range of activities: counter-piracy patrols off
the Horn of Africa, counter-terrorism information sharing,
counter-narcotic activity in Central Asia, support to Afghanistan and
constructing the controversial but widely accepted counter-proliferation
agreement with Iran. Unlike the Cold War, there are zones of
U.S.-Russia cooperation today.
We should convene an international conversation
about protecting the underwater fiber optic grid system, much as we do
for air and sea lanes of communication.
The Cold War dwarfed in size and scope anything we see today. The war
saw millions of soldiers facing each other across the Fulda Gap in
central Europe; two immense battle fleets grappling with each other
across the oceans of the world; and two massive nuclear arsenals on a
hair-trigger alert, ready to launch within minutes. We are not remotely
at that point today.
So what we should do in response to Russian
behavior around the world, including reports of underwater cable
surveillance? We must avoid stumbling backwards into a new Cold War.
This means maintaining open lines of communication, searching for zones
of cooperation where we can find them (from the Arctic to Arms Control)
and taking a deep breath when we see provocations before we respond
militarily. We should convene an international conversation (to include
Russia of course) about protecting the underwater fiber optic grid
system, much as we do for air and sea lanes of communication.
But
we must also stand firmly behind established principles of
international law: nations should not simply annex the territory of
their neighbors, as was done in Ukraine; nor should they support brutal,
lawless, illegal regimes like that of Assad in Syria. We should rally
as much international support as we can muster to criticize such
behavior, and when it is particularly egregious -- as in Ukraine --
impose sanctions.
Our naval forces need to be ready to defend our
submarine cables, exactly as we defend our electrical grid, industrial
base and transportation networks.
Another important component is operational. Our naval forces need to be
ready to defend our submarine cables, exactly as we defend our
electrical grid, industrial base and transportation networks. That means
a robust, highly technical and capable
undersea Navy. The U.S. leads the world in operations underwater, and we absolutely must maintain that edge.
In this context, exercises and operations with key allies and friends
to protect this shared and vital undersea infrastructure is a good
signal to send to the Russians as well. NATO allies, Japan, Australia
and many other friends have significant undersea capabilities: by
practicing and operating together, we help create a stable and protected
global communication grid.
Finally, we need to build more resiliency and redundancy into the
underwater cable network.
It is far too vulnerable to sabotage, especially at the terminals where
the cables are in relatively shallow water. We need more "dark cables"
that are not operational but kept in reserve. The movement of
information is the lifeblood of the global economic system: it needs to
be more secure from accident and attack.
We need more 'dark cables' that are not operational but kept in reserve.
Russia's robust Cold War-like moves should be concerning, but we should
remember what a weak hand of cards Russia actually holds: a declining
population, high rates of alcoholism and drug abuse, few real allies and
an economy that is a one-trick pony. As Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) has
said with a bit of hyperbole, Russia is "a
large gas station masquerading as a country."
Despite these fundamental weaknesses, under Putin, the Russians will
reach for Cold War tools in an effort to prove their global relevance.
It will not broadly succeed as a strategy, and we should not overreact.
Instead, let's take sensible steps to maintain a dialog, cooperate where
we can, confront where we must and protect our vital infrastructure and
interests around the world -- including in the deepest parts of the
sea.
