By George Friedman
In my "
Net Assessment of the World,"
I argued that four major segments of the European and Asian landmass
were in crisis: Europe, Russia, the Middle East (from the Levant to
Iran) and China. Each crisis was different; each was at a different
stage of development. Collectively the crises threatened to destabilize
the Eurasian landmass, the Eastern Hemisphere, and potentially generate a
global crisis. They do not have to merge into a single crisis to be
dangerous. Four simultaneous crises in the center of humanity's
geopolitical gravity would be destabilizing by itself. However, if they
began to merge and interact, the risks would multiply. Containing each
crisis by itself would be a daunting task. Managing crises that were
interlocked would press the limits of manageability and even push
beyond.
These four crises are already
interacting to some extent.
The crisis of the European Union intersects with the parallel issue of
Ukraine and Europe's relation to Russia. The crisis in the Middle East
intersects with the European concern over managing immigration as well
as balancing relations with Europe's Muslim community. The Russians have
been involved in Syria, and appear to have played a significant role in
the recent negotiations with Iran. In addition there is a potential
intersection in Chechnya and Dagestan. The Russians and Chinese have
been advancing discussions about military and economic cooperation. None
of these interactions threaten to break down regional boundaries.
Indeed, none are particularly serious. Nor is some sort of
inter-regional crisis unimaginable.
Sitting at the center of these crisis zones is a country that until a
few years ago maintained a policy of having no problems with its
neighbors. Today, however, Turkey's entire periphery is on fire. There
is fighting in Syria and Iraq to the south, fighting to the north in
Ukraine and an increasingly tense situation in the Black Sea. To the
west, Greece is in deep crisis (along with the EU) and is a historic
antagonist of Turkey. The Mediterranean has quieted down, but the Cyprus
situation has not been fully resolved and tension with Israel has
subsided but not disappeared.
Anywhere Turkey looks there are problems. As important, there are three regions of Eurasia that Turkey touches: Europe, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.
I have argued two things in the past. The first was that Turkey was
an emerging regional power that would ultimately be the major power in
its locale. The second was that this is a region that, ever since the
decline and fall of the Ottomans in the first quarter of the 20th
century, has been kept stable by outside powers. The decision of the
United States to take a secondary role after the destabilization that
began with the 2003 invasion of Iraq has left a vacuum Turkey will
eventually be forced to fill. But Turkey is not ready to fill that
vacuum. That has created a situation in which there is a balancing of
power underway, particularly among Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
A Proximate Danger
The most violent and the most immediate crisis for Ankara is the area
stretching from the Mediterranean to Iran, and from Turkey to Yemen.
The main problem for Turkey is that Syria and Iraq have become
contiguous battlegrounds featuring a range of forces, including Sunni,
Shiite and Kurdish elements. These battles take place in a cauldron
formed by four regional powers: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey.
This quadrangle emerged logically from the mayhem caught between them.
Each major power has differing strategic interests. Iran's primary
interest is the survival of the establishment and in assuring that an
aggressive Sunni polity does not arise in Iraq to replicate the
situation Tehran faced with Saddam Hussein. Iran's strategy is to
support anti-Sunni forces in the region. This support ranges from
bolstering Hezbollah in Lebanon, propping up the minority Alawite
establishment in Syria led — for the moment — by Bashar al Assad, and
assisting the Iraqi army, itself controlled by Shiites and Iraq's Shiite
militias. The United States sees Iran as aligned with American
interests for the moment, since both countries oppose the Islamic State
and Tehran is
important when it comes to containing the militant group.
The reality on the ground has made this the most important issue
between Iran and the United States, which frames the recent accord on
nuclear weapons.
Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its primary enemy. Riyadh also views the
Islamic State as a threat but at the same time fears that an Iraq and
Syria dominated by Iran could present an existential threat to the House
of Saud. The Saudis consider events in Yemen from a similar
perspective. Also in this context, Riyadh perceives a common interest
with Israel in containing Iranian militant proxies as well as the
Islamic State. Who exactly the Saudis are supporting in Syria and Iraq
is somewhat murky, but the kingdom has no choice but to play a tactical
and opportunistic game.
The Israelis are in a similar position to the Saudis. They oppose the
Iranians, but their main concern must be to make certain that the
Hashemites in Jordan don't lose control of the country, opening the door
to an Islamic State move on the Jordan River. Jordan appears stable for
the moment and Israel and the Saudis see this as a main point of their
collaboration. In the meantime, Israel is playing a wait-and-see game
with Syria. Al Assad is no friend to the Israelis, but a weak al Assad
is better than a strong Islamic State rule. The current situation in
Syria suits Israel because a civil war limits immediate threats. But the
conflict is itself out of control and the risk is that someone will
win. Israel must favor al Assad and that aligns them on some level with
Iran, even as Israel works with Sunni players like Saudi Arabia to
contain Iranian militant proxies. Ironies abound.
It is in this context that the Turks have refused to make a clear
commitment, either to traditional allies in the West or to the new
potential allies that are yet emerging. Partly this is because no one's
commitments — except the Iranians' — are clear and irrevocable, and
partly because the Turks don't have to commit unless they want to. They
are deeply opposed to the al Assad regime in Syria, and logic would have
it that they are supporting the Islamic State, which also opposes the
Syrian regime. As I have said before, there are endless rumors in the
region that the Turks are favoring and aiding the Islamic State. These
are rumors that Turkey has responded to by visibly and seriously
cracking down on the Islamic State in recent weeks with significant
border activity and widespread raids. The Turks know that the militants,
no matter what the currently confrontational relationship might be,
could transition from being a primarily Arab platform to being a threat
to Turkey. There are some who say that the Turks see the Islamic State
as creating the justification for a Turkish intervention in Syria. The
weakness of this argument is that there has been ample justification
that Ankara has declined, even as its posture toward the Islamic State
becomes more aggressive.
This shows in Turkey's complex relations with the United States,
still formally its major ally. In 2003 the Turks refused to allow U.S.
forces to invade Iraq from Turkey. Since then the relationship with the
United States has been complex and troubled. The Turks have made U.S.
assistance in defeating al Assad a condition for extensive cooperation
in Syria. Washington, concerned about an Islamic State government in
Syria, and with little confidence in the non-Islamic State militancy as a
long-term alternative, has refused to accept this. Therefore, while the
Turks are now allowing some use of the NATO air base at Incirlik for
operations against the Islamic State, they have not made a general
commitment. Nor have they cooperated comprehensively with Sunni Saudi
Arabia.
The Turkish problem is this: There are no low-risk moves. While
Ankara has a large army on paper, it is untried in battle outside of
Turkey's 30-year insurgency in its southeast. Turkey has also observed
the outcome of U.S. conventional forces intervening in the region and
doesn't want to run the same risk. There are domestic considerations as
well. Turkey is divided
between secular and Islamist factions.
The secularists suspect the Islamists of being secretly aligned with
radical Islam — and are the source of many of the rumors floating about.
The ruling Sunni-dominated Justice and Development Party, better known
by its Turkish acronym, AKP, was seriously weakened in the last
election. Its ability to launch the only attack it wants — an attack to
topple al Assad — would appear to be a religious war to the secularists
and would not be welcomed by the party's base, setting in motion rifts
that could bring down the AKP. An attack on the Sunnis, however radical,
complicates relations with the rebel factions in northern Syria that
Turkey is already sponsoring. It also would risk the backlash of
reviving anti-Turkish feelings in an adjacent Arab country that
remembers Turkish rule only a century ago.
Therefore Turkey, while incrementally changing — as evidenced by the
recent accord to allow U.S. Predator drones to fly from Incirlik — is
constrained if not paralyzed. From a strategic point of view, there
appears to be more risk than reward. Its position resembles Israel's:
watch, wait and hopefully avoid needing to do anything. From the
political point of view, there is no firm base of support for either
intervening directly or providing support for American airstrikes.
The problem is that the worst-case scenario for Turkey is the
creation of an independent Kurdish republic in Syria or Iraq. That would
risk lighting a touchpaper among Kurds in southeastern Turkey, and
regardless of current agreements, could destabilize everything. This is
the one thing that would force Turkey's hand. However, the United States
has historically had some measure of influence among the Kurds in Iraq
and also in Syria. While this influence can be overstated, and while
Washington is dependent on the Kurdish peshmerga militias for ground
support as it battles the Islamic State from the air, it is an important
factor. If the situation grew out of control, Ankara would expect the
United States to control the situation. If Washington could and would,
the price would be Turkish support for U.S. operations in the region.
The Turks would have to pay that price or risk intervention. That is the
lever that would get Ankara involved.
Added Complications
The Turks are far less entangled in the Russian crisis than in the
Middle East, but they are still involved, and potentially in a way that
can pyramid. There are three dimensions to this. The first is the Black
Sea and Turkey's role in it. The second is the Bosporus and the third is
allowing the United States to operate from its air base in Incirlik in
the event of increased Russian military involvement in Ukraine.
The crisis in Ukraine
necessarily involves the Black Sea.
Crimea's Sevastopol is a Russian Base on the Black Sea. In this
potential conflict, the Black Sea becomes a vital theater of operations.
First, in any movement westward by the Russians, the Black Sea is their
right flank. Second, the Black Sea is a vital corridor for trade by the
Russians, and an attempt by its enemies to shut down that corridor
would have to be addressed by Russian naval forces. Finally, the
U.S./NATO strategy in addressing the Ukrainian crisis has been to
increase cooperation with Romania. Romania is on the Black Sea and the
United States has indicated that it intends to work with Bucharest in
strengthening its Black Sea capabilities. Therefore, events in the Black
Sea can rapidly escalate under certain circumstances, posing threats to
Turkish interests that Ankara cannot ignore.
The Black Sea issue is compounded by the question of the Bosporus, which is a narrow strait that, along with the Dardanelles,
connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean.
The Bosporus is the only passage from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean. For the Russians, this is a critical trade route and the
only means for Russian ships passing into the Mediterranean. In the
event of a conflict, the United States and NATO would likely want to
send naval forces into the Black Sea to support operations around its
perimeter.
Under the Montreux Convention, an agreement signed in 1936, the
Bosporus is under Turkish control. However the convention also places
certain restrictions on traffic in the Bosporus. Access is guaranteed to
all commercial traffic, however, Ankara is authorized to refuse transit
to countries at war with Turkey. All countries with coasts on the Black
Sea are free to operate militarily in the Black Sea. Non-Black Sea
nations, however, suffer restrictions. Only warships under 15,000 tones
may be sent, and no more than nine at any one time, with a total tonnage
of 30,000 tons. And then they are only permitted to stay for 21 days or
less.
This limits the ability of the United States to project forces into
the Black Sea — American carrier battle groups, key components of U.S.
naval power,
are unable to pass through.
Turkey is, under international law, the guarantor of the convention and
it has over time expressed a desire to be freed from it so Ankara can
exercise complete sovereignty over the Bosporus Straits. But it has also
been comforted by knowing that refusal to allow warships to pass can be
referred to international law, instead of being Turkish responsibility.
However, in the event of a conflict with Russia, that can no longer
be discounted: Turkey is a member of NATO. If NATO were to formally
participate in such a conflict, Ankara would have to choose whether the
Montreaux Convention or its alliance obligations take precedence. The
same can be said of air operations out of Incirlik. Does Turkey's
relationship with NATO and the United States take precedence or will
Ankara use the convention to control conflict in the Black Sea? Even
prior to its own involvement in any conflict with Russia, there would be
a potentially dangerous diplomatic crisis.
To complicate matters, Turkey receives a great deal of oil and
natural gas from Russia through the Black Sea. Energy relations shift.
There are economic circumstances on which the seller is primarily
dependent on the sale, and circumstances on which the buyer is
dependent. It depends on the room for maneuver. While oil prices were
over $100, Russia had the financial option to stop shipping energy.
Under current pricing, Russia's ability to do this has decreased
dramatically. During the Ukrainian crisis, using energy cut-offs in
Europe would have been a rational response to sanctions. The Russians
did not do it because they could not afford the cost. The prior
obsession with the fragility of the flow of energy from Russia is no
longer there, and Turkey, a major consumer, has reduced its
vulnerability, at least during the diplomatic phase.
The United States is constructing an alliance system that includes the Baltics, Poland and Romania that is designed to
contain any potential Russian advance westward.
Turkey is the logical southern anchor for this alliance structure. The
Turks have been more involved than is already visible — conducting
exercises with the Romanians and Americans in the Black Sea. But as in
the Middle East, Ankara has carefully avoided any commitment to the
alliance and has remained unclear on its Black Sea Strategy. While the
Middle East is more enigmatic, the Russian situation is potentially more
dangerous, though Turkish ambiguity remains identical.
Similarly, Turkey has long demanded
membership in the European Union.
Yet Ankara's economic performance over the last 10 years indicates that
Turkey has benefitted from not being a member. Nevertheless, the
secularists in particular have been adamant about membership because
they felt that joining the union would guarantee the secular nature of
Turkish society. The AKP has been more ambiguous. The party continues to
ask for membership, but it has been quite content to remain outside. It
did not want the EU strictures secularists wanted, nor did it want to
share in the European economic crisis.
Turkey is nevertheless drawn in two directions. First, Ankara has
inevitable economic ties in Europe that are effected by crises,
ironically focused on its erstwhile enemy Greece. More important at the
moment is the immigration and Islamic terrorism crisis in Europe. Many
of the Muslims living in Germany, for example, are Turks and the
treatment of overseas Turks is a significant political issue in Turkey.
While Ankara has wanted to be part of Europe, neither economic reality
nor the treatment of Turks and other Muslims in Europe argue for that
relationship.
There is a growing breach with Europe in an attempt to avoid
absorption of economic problems. However in southeastern Europe
discussions of Turkish investments and trade are commonplace. Put into
perspective, as Europe fragments, Turkey — a long-term economic power,
understanding of what the short-term problems are — draws southeastern
Europe into its economic center of gravity. In a way it becomes another
force of fragmentation, simply by being an alternate economic benefactor
for the poorer countries in the southeast.
The potential interaction of Turkey in the Middle East is an
immediate question. The mid-term involvement with Russia is a longer
question. Its relation to Europe is the longest question. And its
relationship with the United States is the single question that
intersects all of these. For all these concerns, Turkey has no clear
answer. It is following a strategy designed to avoid involvement and
maintain maximum options. Ankara relies on a multi-level strategy in
which it is formally allied with some powers and quietly open to
relations with powers hostile to its allies. This multi-hued doctrine is
designed to avoid premature involvement; premature meaning before
having achieved a level of strategic maturity and capability that allows
it to define itself, with attendant risks.
In one sense, Turkish policy parallels American policy. U.S. policies
in all three regions are designed to allow the regional balance of
power to maintain itself, with Washington involving itself selectively
and with limited force. The Turks are paralleling the United States in
principle, and with even less exposure. The problem the Turks have is
that geography binds them to the role of pivot for three regions. For
the United States this role is optional. The Turks cannot make coherent
decisions, but they must. So Ankara's strategy is to be consistently
ambiguous, an enigma. This will work until outside powers make it
impossible to work.
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