ANALYSIS
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Sunday, December 29, 2013
Albania, EU accession and security issues
By Ioannis Michaletos/
The present state of affairs in
Albania regarding its impeding EU accession is far from rosy judging
amongst other by the hesitation of countries such as UK, Germany,
Netherlands and Czech Republic to accept an eventual inclusion of that country in the EU.
Concurrently Albania’s neighbor, Greece which assumes the EU
Presidency 1st of January 2014 and for the next 6 months, appears to be
as one of the most fervent supports for the case of Tirana. Below the
surface though, tension brews which is illustrated by a set of
developments. These include defense developments and serious security
concerns regarding organized crime activities.
Tirana-Ankara line and the mistrust
In December 2013, the head of the Albanian PDIU political party,
which has a clear-cut line in its foreign policy proposals against
Greece, visited Ankara and was hosted personally by the vice-President
of the governing AKP party. The Albanian press noted that this visit
marked an intense and long-term cooperation between PDIU and the Turkish
AKP. What is more interesting though is that Turkey proposed and PDIU
accepted for common stance in the relations between Albania and Greece,
which in diplomatic terms can be considered as a “non-friendly” gesture
towards the latter.
In addittion the Albanian Armed forces received a 3 million Euros
donation of military vehicles from Turkey. Since the early 00′s the
Albanian Army has accepted a significant number of donations, whilst
Albanian special forces regularly receive training by their Turkish
counterparts, who in turn have as a basic doctrine the fight against
Greek military targets in the event of an armed conflict between the two
countries. In fact the definite assessment that has been formed in the
Greek defense and
security power
circles for some time is that the Albanian forces are becoming
“satellite-like ones” of the Turkish Army, an assumption that leads
Athens to eventually consider Albania as a non-friendly state in all
practical terms, apart from naming it directly. The aforementioned cover
a very small part of the overall discussion regarding Greek-Albanian
defense relations, which do not conclude with the involvement solemnly
of Turkey.
Furthermore, in recent nationwide Gallop type surveys in both Greece and
Albania which were conducted by the Albanian institute of
international relations
with the assistance of the Greek ELIAMEP foundation, interesting
findings were laid down. 34% of the Greeks questioned consider the
Albanian immigrants as a “threat” and 15% are worried about “Albanian
nationalism”. Also 32% do not want Albania into the EU.
The Albanians questioned, 18.5% of them consider Greece as the “prime
external threat”, more than the 17% which consider Serbia.
Insignificant number mentioned also FYROM, Montenegro and Italy. These
data further add to the general assumption that mistrust and a societal
feeling of common opposition fills the bilateral relations between the
two states.
Better safe than sorry
In Mid-December 2013 and in the midst of all the above culminations,
the Greek Armed forces performed a military exercise in the Lake Prespes
region close to the borders with Albania. The exercise was code named
“Pyrpolytis 11/13″ and constituted a 24-hour rapid movement of elite
forces aiming in theory to disband and neutralize incoming “irregular
forces” from Albania, which would be assisted by “terrorist cells”.
Several units from the Greek Alpine Commando force were used, along with
4 Chinook and 2 Apache helicopters and various specially designed
vehicles for mountainous war.
The Prespes region is over the past few years a crossroad for drug
traffickers from Albania, while the Greek security apparatus strongly
believes that elements belonging to veteran members of the UCK are
“testing” for years the preparedness of the Greek armed forces,
especially after the commence of the economic crisis in the country in
2010. The information leaked so far by credible sources in the Greek
media and amongst local stakeholders, talk about “loose cells” of UCK
veteran members in Greece in the land axis between the lake Prespes and
Tymfistros mountain in central Greece, along with a few dozen members in
the outskirts of Athens. In total there are around 150 suspected
persons that for the moment deal heavily with drug trafficking and arms
contraband.
All the available information point out that ex-UCK members, which
presently deal exclusively with the organized crime in the Balkans, have
from time to time attempted to “test” the Greek border and domestic
security system in a significant scale, nevertheless the attempts were
thwarted so far. That has lead in a shift in strategy within the Greek
Armed forces which now have developed a separate high-alert commando
structure that will be aided by air force and heavily armed Police
elements, exclusively dealing with the issue and fusing its operational
aims with those of the border Police when in terms with organized
criminal activities.
A distorted Balkan “Switzerland”
The small town of Lazarati, relatively close to the borders with
Greece and FYROM, is the primal hashish production region in Europe.
Lazarati’s 4,000 inhabitants are fully occupied with cannabis
production, which reaches from 500 tons to 1,200 tons per year depending
on the crop. It is estimated that the Lazarati region “pumps” 200-450
million Euros into the Albanian economy which is around 3% of its
nominal GDP! Moreover the total revenue for the Albanian organized crime
and their associates in several countries in wholesale and retail sales
value of the drug produced, reaches from 2 billion Euros to more than 4
billion Euros per annum.
Division of labor: Women in Lazarati cutting and preparing the new crop.
Despite efforts by the Albanian police which has confiscated in its
territory more than 100 tons in 2013, and the pressure exercised,
especially by the Greek and Italian authorities, the Lazarati production
is undisturbed and the whole town is armed to the teeth to protect its
riches which produce an average 100,000 Euros per year for every person,
making it one of the richest regions in Europe, bar several communities
in Switzerland, Monaco and Lichtenstein.
The drug production in Lazarati is mostly exported to Greece, Italy,
and to Central Europe (via FYROM and Kosovo and all the way through the
Northern Balkan drug route). Apart from fuelling corruption in a social
and political context in Albania it is also a major security concern for
the whole of the region, due to the financial empowerment it boosts to
the local criminal syndicates. Further, the hashish production is being
greatly assisted by the massive use of chemical agents for fast plant
growth which in turn causes long-term health hazards to the “consumers”,
which in most part are EU citizens.
The Lazarati drug lords are also directly connected with arms
trafficking of light weapons, especially machine guns and hand grenades
which are being trafficked both to Greece and Italy, while it remains a
mystery how money laundering takes place of such significant amounts of
cash in a country with little developed financial sector services. Thus,
it can be safely assumed that money laundering takes place outside the
borders of Albania with likely territories, Montenegro, Istanbul, FYROM,
Ukraine, Moldova, Kosovo, and Bosnia. Lastly great amounts of cash in
the tube of tens of millions perhaps even greater would be “stashed” in
the Lazarati town, literally hidden in mattresses and warehouses used as
“safe deposits”.
In overall, Greek-Albanian relations and the ongoing EU accession of
Tirana are filtered through the prism of the security concerns of Athens
which tend to grow over time. On the other hand, the Albanian society
is increasingly urbanized and getting into tune with the rest of the EU,
requiring the rule of Law to be implemented within its territory and
relinquishing role models of “guerilla behavior” that still dominate
large stratums of the society in the peripheries of the country.
The fight between the two worlds will ultimately decide the fate of
the likely entrance of Albania into the EU. Concluding it can be safely
estimated that in 2014 no Western Balkan countries (Bosnia, Montenegro,
Albania, Serbia, and FYROM) will get the “green light” ahead from
Brussels and security concerns play a decisive role, apart from economic
considerations and bilateral differences.