Wednesday, November 16, 2022

Mitsotakis (and) failures in the Balkans

SManalysis






Prime Minister Mr. Mitsotakis, two months ago at the TIF, expressed determination towards Albania, declaring: "In every chapter that opens (in the EU) we have the opportunity to impose our own views and discuss bilateral issues character of our relations".

By ALEXANDROS TARKA * 
newsbreak.gr

With similar wording, he repeatedly assured North Macedonia that Greece "has the right to negotiate every chapter of the pre-accession process" and "at any time to veto".

But the performance of Mr. Mitsotakis' Balkan policy is below expectations. Deep down, he recognizes it himself. There is no other way to explain that he has placed his hopes in foreign officials, asking -suddenly- for their interventions in an area where Greece (during all of Mr. Mitsotakis' predecessors, from 2000 to 2019) had a leading presence.

Indicative of the impasse is that the prime minister, during the October 27 talks with Chancellor Olaf Solz, reportedly requested Berlin's intervention for Albania's return to the maritime zone delimitation dialogue with Greece, as well as for North Macedonia's compliance in spirit and the provisions of the Prespa Agreement. At the level of manipulation, Mr. Mitsotakis' request to the chancellor, although slightly humiliating for the strength and image of Greek diplomatic influence, might have been a way out. Because ahead of the upcoming "Berlin Process for the Western Balkans" summit in the German capital on November 3, Mr Solz could put pressure on Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and his so-called "Macedonian" counterpart Dimitar Kovacefksi .

However, the chancellor, as it turned out at the meeting, did not risk personal involvement in the complex Balkan problems. After all, he adopted the same attitude last May in Greek-Turkish affairs, rejecting the request of Mr. Mitsotakis to mediate with the president R.T. Erdogan to defuse the tension. Also, before 20 days in Athens, Mr. Soltz showed that he is satisfied with monitoring the contacts of his diplomatic advisor (former ambassador to Greece) Jens Pletner with the strong man of Ankara, the advisor Imp. Kalin.

After the successive German refusals, the way out for Maximus appears to be the submission of the same requests to Washington. The American Embassy in Athens is the only suitable channel for now, since the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ant. Blinken does not intend to travel to Greece anytime soon (perhaps also due to the informal start of the pre-election period), but some preliminary contacts do not appear promising. However, Washington is promoting the signing of a tripartite energy agreement between Athens, Tirana and Skopje, which might be used by Mr. Mitsotakis, to somewhat boost his international profile in the midst of the wiretapping scandal.

The next milestone of developments is the EU summit. – Western Balkans in Tirana on December 6. The aim of the government, bilaterally, is to launch the procedures for signing the co-promise to refer the issue of maritime zones with Albania to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Unfortunately, despite the October 2020 agreement in principle, Mr. Rama (influenced by Turkey) is backtracking. Furthermore, it questions the validity of certain preliminary actions by Athens, despite their unquestionable legality under the Law of the Sea.

As for North Macedonia, the situation reaches the limits of the picturesque! To the specific Greek demands for the implementation of the Prespa Agreement (e.g. ending the widespread use of the term "Macedonian" in official documents and events), Skopje replied - according to the well-known anecdote - that they would set up a committee to study the outstanding issues.

* Publisher of the magazine "Defense & Diplomacy" and consultant to foreign companies studying business risk for SE Europe

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