The
launch vehicle unit carrying two Yakhont anti-ship missiles in
container launchers. The missiles are carried in the recessed position
and launched vertically from the erected canisters.
The
expected arrival of the P800 Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missile in
Syria is considered the first serious attempt by Syria to directly
challenge the Israel Navy since the 1973 war, when the Israeli Navy sunk
five Syrian vessels in the first missile-boat engagement known as the
‘Battle of Latakia’. Four decades later, the P800 Yakhont is far
superior than the Styx missiles that failed to protect the Syrian Navy
in 1973. Much like the Russian-Indian Brahmos, the earlier Moskit and
Supersonic Alpha, Yakhont has the capability to strike its target at
supersonic speed, flying at very low level, leaving the defender much
shorter time to react. Yet, ship defenses have come a long way since the
Electronic Warfare (EW) systems that saved the day and won the battle
for the Israelis.
AEGIS systems, used on U.S. Navy and many NATO
vessels, the European PAAMS, used by the Royal Navy, French and Italian
navies and Israel’s new Barak 8 ship air defense system are designed to
match such treats. So does Israel’s ‘Magic Wand’ system, employing the
Stunner missile interceptor, capable to counter these potent missiles
effectively if employed in surface/surface or ship/surface role.
However, the majority of smaller naval vessels, still equipped with
‘point defense’ anti-missile systems were not designed to counter such
high speed attacks, particularly when it comes in salvos of two or four
missile.
Such
elements are at risk within ranges of 300 km, by missiles fired from
the Mediterranean Syrian naval bases at Tartus and Latakia. Yakhont
typically cruises to the target area at high altitude, and then descends
for a sea skimming attack from under the horizon. The distance at which
it begins its descent can be programmed before launch, by determining
the achievable range, which is between 120 (low level flight) – 300 km
(high mid-course, low-level beyond the horizon to the target.
The
potential coverage of P800 Yakhont missiles fired from coastal sites
(Tartus) or land sites in Southern Syria cover Israel's Mediterranean
Naval Bases.
While some navies could avoid this area, for
Israel, the long range of the P800 means its naval vessels could be at
risk, even at their main base in Haifa, a site already compromised by
rockets fired from Lebanon during the 2006 war. Israel’s second naval
base in Ashdod could be targeted from land-based sites in Southern
Syria. Furthermore, when targeting Israeli naval patrols in
international waters off the Lebanese coast, P800 can be vertically
launched from inland sites in Syria or Lebanon, fired behind the Lebanon
mountain ridge, avoiding detection from the sea, thus minimizing the
early warning for the targeted vessels. Therefore, accelerated fielding
of Barak-8 and Magic Wand systems should be a top priority for Israel.
Another risk for Navies operating in the Persian Gulf presents a
technology leak – by such a missile falling into Iranian hands, which
could accelerate the introduction of such potent weapons in Tehran’s
growing anti-shipping arsenal.
The
operational concept of the Bastion P coastal defense system employs
multiple mobile launchers each carrying two Yakhont missiles, capable of
attacking targets at a distance of 250 km from the coast. Targeting is
provided by helicopters or other airborne platforms, coastal radars or
ships at sea. Each launch unit is operating independently, or coordinate
its activity with another launch vehicle located up to 15 km away,
targeting, command and control are provided by the central command
vehicle and regional command post that can be located more than 25 km
apart.
The current contract, estimated to be worth $300
million includes the delivery of two Bastion coastal defense systems,
each includes 36 missiles. It is yet unclear if the Syrian navy will
also opt to equip its naval platforms will with these new weapons. The
Yakhont can be fitted with relatively small vessels, from corvette size
and larger. The Bastion system is operated from mobile launchers on
land, each launcher carries two ready to launch missiles. Another
configuration is designed for airborne platforms. But even with these
potent weapons in hand, the Syrians may not yet be ready to employ them
effectively. Syria currently does not have the means to effectively
target the missile beyond the horizon, lacking maritime patrol aircraft,
unmanned aerial vehicles or attack aircraft capable of carrying such
missiles. Even their largest Petya class Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) frigates do not have a flight deck for the Ka-28 (Helix)
helicopters, operated by the Syrian Navy. The Syrians do not have
the capability to detect, track and designate targets at those ranges
since, being a small, defensive force, they did not have any weapon
reaching out to these ranges. This is particularly true when the target
is ‘silent’ and cannot be targeted by surface-based Electronic Support
Measures (ESM).
Each mobile transporter-launcher carrying two Yakhont P800 missiles.
If
the Syrians are seriously planning to extend their operational reach
with the missile, one has to watch out for Syria to reach for UAVs,
naval patrol aircraft (Be-200 or Il-38 from any CIS nation or other
countries (decommissioning such aircraft could be an option). Such
transfer of equipment could be unnoticed as it does not involves weapons
transfer. They could also opt for upgrading the Su-24MK ‘Fencer D’ to
take on maritime recce role. Even more serious is a combination of
Su-27/Su-30 and P800s, which could provides the P800 with the stand-off
targeting and attack capability against surface targets. The Russians
are using their Onyx version of the weapon with their Su-33
carrier-based naval fighters. By knowing the P800 is within range, the
Israeli Navy will definitely lose its dominant and unchallenged position
in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly along the Lebanese coast,
and therefore should take defensive measures – certainly be on guard,
which it failed, during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when ISN Hanit
was hit unexpectedly by a Hizbollan C-802 missile – having turned off
its on-board defensive systems.
Of course, for deliberate ‘ambush’
attacks Syria could try deploying forward targeting using merchant or
fishery vessels sailing in the Eastern Mediterranean or submarines,
provided by allies such as Iran (since Syria do not have any submarines
now, after decommissioning their 3 Romeo subs about six years ago). But
this is really a long, long shot that would cost Syria dearly.
Altogether,
for the short term, the arrival of the P800 in the Mediterranean is a
serious threat. Over time, as the Israel Navy gets its Barak-8 missiles
and ‘Magic Wand’ deployed, the threat could be contained, given the
Syrians will not deploy large numbers of these missiles on platforms and
constellations that would maximize its capability to launch saturation
attack against the IN leading vessels. Whatever the case may be, both
sides, the Syrians and the Israelis need time to deploy and defend so
the threat may be serious, at first sight, but viable solutions are
already in sight.
The Russians are using their Onyx version of the weapon with their Su-33 carrier-based naval fighters.
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