By Andrew KORYBKO (USA)
Oriental review
(Please read Part I prior to this article)
The Power Of The Christian Community
The State Of Religious Affairs:
What’s usually left out of the conversation when discussing Albania
is the strategic Christian minority inhabiting the northern and southern
border regions, and the potential for them to sympathize more with
their co-confessionalists next door than with their “Greater Albania”
ethnic counterparts in Tirana. It’s no secret that Christian influence
is on the upswing in the Balkans, and this zeitgeist has even spread
into Albania in the years since communism. Although recognized as a
majority-Muslim state, the
2011 census
surprisingly lists 10% of the population as being Catholic and 6.7%
being Orthodox, with each denomination being clustered in the north and
south of the country, respectively.
In total, this makes for a population that’s 16.7% Christian as
compared to 58.7% who are Muslim, but there’s an important qualitative
difference between the two, and it’s that the Christians are much more
pious than the largely secular Muslims. After all, it wasn’t just for
show that Pope Francis chose Albania to be his
first European trip outside of Italy
in September 2014, and scattered online reports indicate that Muslim
conversions to Christianity (specifically Catholicism and its related
sects) are on the rise. Concerning the Albanians that occupy Kosovo,
Reuters even ran a 2008
piece
detailing how some of them have decided to embrace their
“crypto-Catholic” roots, which underscores the developing role that
Christianity is playing in the Albanian-populated areas of the Balkans.
Catholicism On The Come Up:
An
Ethnic Albanian couple carrying a portrait of Mother Teresa draped with
Albanian Flag, as they attend a Mass in Pristina, Kosovo
One can also recall at this time the global renown of the late
Catholic nun popularly known as Mother Teresa, an ethnic Albanian
originally from the territory of the Republic of Macedonia (Skopje, to
be exact). Her beautification by the Catholic Church has placed her on
the short list to sainthood, and she remains one of the most well-known
Albanians to this day. Because of her Albanian ethnicity and the warm
feelings most of the world has towards her, she’s become a symbol of
sorts for the country and is even quite popular within it. There has yet
to be any quantitative evidence produced to establish the following,
but it could be that the “Teresa Effect” has made some non-religious or
even Muslim Albanians more receptive to Christianity, similar to how the
so-called “Francis Effect” has invigorated many lay Catholics.
Of course, it goes without saying that the Vatican has its own
self-serving interests in proselytizing the faith across the Strait of
Otranto, but it’s undeniable that Christianity (most specifically of the
Catholic denomination) has become a tangible fact of life in some parts
of Albanian society nowadays. The author is personally impartial to
this process and doesn’t want to come off as supporting any religion or
denomination over the other, but it needs to be objectively recognized
by the reader that Albania is, however surprising it may sound to some,
one of the few places in the world where Christianity has grown since
the end of the Cold War.
Switching Places:
As a self-assertive and proselytizing Christianity comes up against a
secular and stagnant Islam, there are bound to be political
consequences in the near future, especially as some representatives of
the dominant faith become more conservative in reaction to the upstart
religion. This is peculiarly ironic, since it mirrors exactly what’s
happening in the EU, except with the roles of Islam and Christianity
reversed. Just as there are some Christian-affiliated extremist groups
that agitate for violence against Muslims, so too will there likely be
Islamist-affiliated ones that target Christians. Neither of these
faith-based radicals represents the bulk of their co-confessionals, but
nonetheless, they’re the loudest, most visible, and most violent
reactionaries from a largely passive majority.
In the EU case, many fret that there are foreign influences guiding
the large-scale insertion of Islamic elements into their traditionally
Christian societies, and a similar fear could predictably be felt in
Albania as per the Catholic proselytizers (“missionaries”) operating in
the mostly Muslim country. In both cases, it’s understandable that
there’d be a domestic backlash of sorts by the host representatives
against the “new arrivals”, even if they’re really native converts such
as the Christians in Albania. It’s guaranteed that inter-communal
tensions would skyrocket the moment any of these minority identity
groups begin engaging in politics or pushing an agenda that is perceived
(keyword) to be affiliated with their religion. The author doesn’t
intend to justify any sort of violence between these groups, but rather
hopes that the previous explanation can help the reader understand the
process that is already taking place in Europe, and might soon develop
in Albania if the structural similarities between the two’s relationship
to upstart religions are any reliable indication.
Vanguard Dissidents:
The Christian minority in Albania is strategically positioned to
become the vanguard dissidents against the Tirana elite’s ‘unifying’
ideology of “Greater Albania”. Like was mentioned at the beginning of
Part II, the Albanian power-makers fear that this demographic might come
to identify more with its co-confessionalists next door than with their
ethnic counterparts in the capital, and that the first form of
resistance this may take is in objecting to “Greater Albania”. They
might have their practical and pragmatic reasons for this, such as not
wanting to create another failed region in the Balkans like Kosovo, or
it might be motivated by barely concealed religious concerns that
“Greater Albania” is really a code word for anti-Christianity, again, as
seen by the example of Kosovo. No matter what drives them to do so, the
moment this demographic starts pushing back against “Greater Albania”,
that’s when the country will begin entering the most serious crisis in
its history, conceivably one which may reach existential proportions.
To explain, no other identity group in Albania is capable of
coalescing into a unified bloc quicker than the Christians (and
especially Catholics) are, and if they can mobilize any of their
existing or soon-to-be-created civil society organizations to help
advance a political goal, then they’d immediately emerge as a major
force to be reckoned with in Albanian society. Neither Ghegs, Tosks, nor
Muslims have as much potential in currently doing so as Christians
because the self-awareness of their distinct identities has yet to set
in, largely due to the distracting success of “Greater Albania”.
Therefore, if the group least affected by this ideology turns into the
first one to publicly oppose it (on whatever grounds, be they pragmatic,
religious, or a hybrid of both), then it would prompt the government to
react in some form or another in order to save the ‘unifying’ ideology
that it so desperately needs in order to remain in power and keep
“Albanians” from decentralizing into mores specific Gheg, Tosk, and
Muslim identities.
The Islamic Backlash
The First Move:
There are many ways in which Tirana could respond to the Christians’
resistance to “Greater Albania”, but the shape it takes ultimately
depends on what the dissidents do first. Although it’s possible to
project some type of protests in the event that “Greater Albanian”
rhetoric once more hits dangerous proportions in Tirana, it’s more
likely that such resistance will first be passive and will refrain from
physical manifestations until that point. To expand on this idea, it’s
probable that local civic figures and Christian-identifying politicians
could try to raise the issue whenever given the chance, preferably in a
mass media or grassroots (canvassing) platform, despite the reputational
and/or career repercussions this could have. The emergence of Christian
individuals agitating against “Greater Albania” will be seen by
decision makers as being religiously motivated and influenced from
abroad (even if this isn’t the case and such actions are driven purely
by domestic pragmatism), so they’d probably reactively resort towards
encouraging the soft Islamization of society, which might even include
enhanced cooperation with Turkish government-affiliated organizations in
a hasty effort to emulate part of Erdogan’s ‘success’.
The Turkish Connection:
President
of Albania, Bujar Nishani and President of Turkey, Recep Tayyp Erdogan
attend the foundation stone ceremony on Mosque of Namazgja site in
Tirana, May 2015.
At this point it doesn’t matter if the Prime Minister is Christian
(like Edi Rami), Muslim, or Atheist – what’s critical to understand is
that he and his elite cohorts have a high likelihood of responding to
any Christian-affiliated dissent (even if not religiously motivated) by
mechanically trying to ‘unify’ the population under the alternative
ideology of Islamism (wrongfully assuming that this would succeed simply
because a majority of the population is Muslim), following in the
footsteps of their national ‘big brother’ in Turkey. It’s not
coincidental that Albania has allowed Turkey to begin building the
Balkans’ largest mosque
in its capital, personally inaugurated by the strongman himself during
his last visit to Tirana, since it’s a clear sign of the country’s
strategic submission to its historical occupant.
Erdogan might already be entertaining plans to shift his failed
Neo-Ottomanism away from the Mideast and towards the Balkans, and an
Islamified Albanian society along the Muslim Brotherhood tradition of
his preference would be seen as a red-carpet rollout for Turkey’s return
to the region. Thus, Erdogan indisputably has a strategic stake in
seeing his Albanian proxy following Turkey’s lead in Islamifying its
society, and if there’s even the tiniest opportunity for him to convince
his underlings in Tirana to go through with his preplanned vision for
their country out of what he would characterize as their ‘national
interest’ and/or ‘religious duty’, then he’ll surely seize It and supply
all manner of support as necessary.
“Mission Creep”:
Some of Albania’s decision makers might rightfully feel uncomfortable
about violating their country’s secularist traditions, but they’d
probably be ‘assured’ that such steps are going to be incremental,
‘comfortable’, and nothing too extreme from the existing standard.
Turkish strategists might even try convincing them that Islamization and
“Greater Albania” could actually become complementary ideologies, with
the former being ‘necessary’ in order to isolate the Christian
dissidents so that the latter can ultimately be achieved. This line of
thinking could come off as enticing and ‘manageable’ to the elite, who
might agree that a ‘back-up’ ideology is necessary to embolden the
Albanian base and discredit Christian naysayers.
As the Islamization of secular states historically shows, however,
this could quickly become an uncontrollable process that swiftly eludes
the management of the forces that initially set it into motion. When the
time comes that an Islamifying government finds itself under the
influence of the non-state actors that it had earlier set loose upon the
secular majority (and this always happens sooner or later in such
societies), then the threshold has irreversibly been passed to where
religious-affiliated terrorism can endemically take root in the country,
to say nothing of the assumed-to-be earlier advances of foreign-based
terrorist infiltrators (be they in ‘hard’ militant form or disguised via
‘soft’ Wahhabist clerics). One mustn’t forget the tens of thousands of
mostly Islamist-sympathizing Mideast migrants that Albania wants to
bring into the country in the near future either, since it’s sure that
they’ll have play an instrumental role in this process as well (and all
to Erdogan’s nodding approval).
Assessing The Destabilization Potential Of Albania
Situational Review:
“Greater Albania” has consistently been pursued in one form or
another as the country’s de-facto national ideology since the end of
communism, and there has yet to be a moment when significant domestic
dissent openly challenged the notions of this ‘unifying’ precept. It
should be recalled that there are two parallel processes ongoing in
Albanian society at the moment, with one being its Christianization and
the other its inevitable return to the full-scale promotion “Greater
Albania”. The reader would do well to remember that the latter is being
evoked as a distracting response to the large-scale economic crisis in
the country, following the pattern set out in 1997 in reacting to
similar (albeit more political) domestic difficulties during that time.
The “Greater Albania” trend will not turn against the country’s
Christian population (although it didn’t spare any of Serbia’s during
the Occupation of Kosovo), but Albanian Christians might turn against
“Greater Albania” for whatever their religious or pragmatic reasons may
be. This in turn would prompt a reaction from the authorities that is
predicted to unintentionally open the Pandora’s Box of identity
decentralization in Albania, with three scenario paths being the most
foreseeable.
People’s Revolution:
This scenario is the least ‘sexy’ of the three, but is the one with
the greatest chance of occurring. Once the ideology of “Greater Albania”
is challenged from within and its hypnotizing effect on distracting the
disaffected and impoverished majority of the country’s citizens has
faded, they may snap out of their earlier induced ‘trance’ and begin
attributing their plight to the elite that are truly responsible for it.
The chain reaction of social activism that this would set off could
turn Albania into the next “Moldova”, in the sense of civil society
organizing against its corrupt overseers and attempting to finally free
the country from their thieving clutches. A lot of this would be based
in the naiveté that they’d be able to make a pronounced difference by
enacting the symbolic retirement of one or two figureheads, but still,
in the context of this article, it would satisfy the criteria for
creating national destabilization, especially if the targeted leader
refuses to steps down, or even worse, resorts to state or militia
violence to disperse the protesters.
The difference between this scenario and a Color Revolution is that
this examined situation is entirely natural and free from external
tinkering. No foreign power manipulated Albania into creating the
deplorable conditions that gave rise to tens of thousands of its
citizens leaving their country and the colony of Kosovo this year alone,
since nobody is to blame for this but the Tirana elite themselves.
Additionally, it’s absurd to even conceive of a foreign power having a
hand behind the protests, since the US and the West would be dead-set
against them, while Serbia and Russia, aside from not having the
operational experience in handling such covert operations, have no
social capital whatsoever from which to recruit and influence Albanians.
This possible People’s Revolution would be entirely by Albanians and
for Albanians, and depending on the composition of its protesting
elements, it might even take on an extreme nationalist angle similar to
EuroMaidan (minus the foreign support in this case, it must once again
be reminded). That course of developments would all depend on how the
Tirana elite respond to the protest movement and exactly which social
elements play the leading parts in organizing it.
Religious Warfare:
Albania has a history of waging religious conflicts both without and
beyond its borders. During the leadership of Enver Hoxha, the state
implemented a lethal atheization policy where religious practitioners of
all faiths could be killed for their beliefs. This was an internal war
within the state between the government and all religions. After
communism ended, Albanian elements waged another religious war, also
with government support, but this time outside of its borders and with
the intent of brutally cleansing the Christian population out of Kosovo.
The time seems to be coming for a new stage to Albania’s religious
wars, and this time it might once again be concentrated within the
country itself.
The uptick in Christianity, especially if it’s politicized to an
extent, could lead to the ‘moderate’ state-sponsored Islamization of
society under Erdogan’s supervision. It might ‘logically’ begin as a
Turkish-advised reaction to any Christian dissent against “Greater
Albania”, but it could quickly spiral out of control and turn into a
bloody sectarian conflict that would inevitably involve the support of
foreign actors on both sides (perhaps morphing into a Serbian-Turkish
proxy war that takes on the misleading simplification of being Christian
vs. Muslim). Amidst the violence (or at the very least, inter-communal
tension), ISIL and other affiliated radical Wahhabist groups might find
fertile ground for gathering recruits and setting up base in the
increasingly fractured society, which would in any case bode extremely
negatively for the entire Balkan region at large.
The Fight For Federalization:
Catalyzed by the Christians’ awareness of their particular
sub-Albanian identity (no matter to what degree they express it, so long
as they do), the Ghegs and Tosks might become emboldened enough to
realize their own identity uniqueness, especially if society begins
Islamifying per the abovementioned scenario and individuals begin
searching for a ‘third way’. Understanding that the ‘unifying’ utility
of “Greater Albania” might be irreparably damaged once one sub-national
identity (predicted to be Christians in this case) begins expressing its
distinctiveness, it’s safe to assume that a ‘race for identities’ would
surely follow, and in this case, geo-dialect affiliation could possibly
become the most popular. In this projected reality, it’s conceivable
that the Gheg and Tosk spaces would make an effort to consolidate within
their zones so as to protect their identities from the ‘security
dilemma’ between one another, and between themselves and the religiously
connected ones that have just begun sprouting up (and precipitated this
whole identity crisis in the first place).
One of the most logical steps in this case would be for the Ghegs and
Tosks (predicted to be the two most dominant of the competing
identities) to formally delineate their spheres of geographic influence,
which as was written in Part I, would traditionally be along the
Shkumbin River. Having observed how state decentralization quickly
spirals out of control in the absence of a unifying ideology to keep
everything together, the only alternative to anarchy would be either a
military operation launched by the centralized authorities or the
federalization of the country along the lines of its most prominent
politically represented constituent parties. In the case of Albania,
it’s impossible at this point to predict if military force would be used
in such a scenario (and whether the military could remain united among
escalating identity tensions between its members), but it’s much more
plausible to assume that federalization between the quickly consolidated
Gheg and Tosk entities could seriously be discussed. In fact, depending
on the organization of the Christian community prior to the outbreak of
identity decentralization, they might even be able to attain a
semi-autonomous status either within Albania proper or inside one or
both of the two predicted federal entities (if it comes to it, most
likely in the Catholic portion of North Gheg).
Concluding Thoughts
Albanian politicians agitate for the Fascist-era recreation of
“Greater Albania” as a desperate measure to compensate for internal
weakness. The country’s failing economy precipitates the need to
distract the citizenry from internal woes, and the potential for a
North-South regionalist identity forming among the Gheg and Tosk dialect
communities compels the elite to continuously pursue this ‘unifying’
ideology. Largely neglected when discussing Albania but no less
important than its economic woes and geo-dialect division is the
emerging Christian community in the country, and it’s possible that this
new domestic identity might be self-assertive enough to set off a chain
reaction of identity decentralization in the future. If the Christians
mobilize into a semi-unified movement or union of interest groups and
begin pursuing a shared political cause, then they’d draw attention to
the presence of sub-national identities (desperately impoverished
citizens, Gheg speakers, and Tosk speakers) that the ‘unifying’ ideology
of “Greater Albania” tries to soothe over.
Should the Christians begin directly campaigning against “Greater
Albania”, be it through religious or pragmatic considerations, then that
would be the greatest (unwitting) attack on national unity that Albania
has ever experienced before in its history, and it would automatically
result in some sort of state-sponsored response. The predicted
Turkish-advised ‘soft’ Islamization of society, already apparently in
the cards for a future deployment, would ultimately end up being
disastrous for the unified state and would do more to polarize the
country than save it, despite Erdogan’s predicted assurances to the
contrary. In the ensuring tumult that’s sure to follow any revival of
sub-national identity consciousness in Albania (whether or not the
Islamist scenario comes into play), it can be heavily predicted that the
Ghegs and Tosks will start forming more distinct geo-dialect identities
that could pave the way for a weakening of the previously assumed
‘cohesive’ nature of the Albanian state. That by itself would probably
kill the national mobilization of support necessary to revive the vague
concept of “Greater Albania” once its citizens start thinking in terms
of “Gheg-Albania” and “Tosk-Albania” (if not outright Gheg and Tosk
identities outside the constructed Albanian nationality), and might
perchance become the most long-lasting (and ironically self-imposed)
deterrent to Albanian aggression, and consequently the most solid
guarantor of Balkan peace for the coming future.
Andrew Korybko is the American political commentaror currently working for the Sputnik agency, exclusively for ORIENTAL REVIEW.
