Review: Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent
University of Plymouth Press (2010), 224 pp.
Reviewed by Chris Deliso
This
comparative analytical work discusses two memorable showdowns between
Greece and Turkey, events that exemplified both countries’ balance of
power and political and military strategic capacities and goals in the
late 20th-century. These affairs – the first, a war of words
accompanied by military buildups in 1987 and the second, the much more
serious Imia crisis of January 1996 – occurred in an environment in
which some of the same conditions that applied then apply still now.
Analysts will thus find a wealth of useful insight in Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent,
which will help in assessing the Greek-Turkish relationship today. The
book is, of course, also an engrossing read for the armchair historian
or intelligence buff. The vivid recounting of the decision-making
processes of Greek leaders, civilian and military intelligence, and the
armed forces (particularly the Navy) is peppered with new commentary
from former high-level officials who were active during the period in
question, adding to the book’s appeal.
Indeed, on January 30, Prime Minister Simitis was handed, but “seemed uninterested” in, a personal letter from CIA Director George Tenet. It had been passed on to NIS Director Leonidas Vasikiopoulos from the Athens CIA station chief. The letter stated Tenet’s view that “it would be disastrous for Greece, Turkey and NATO if war broke out due to escalation of the [Imia] incident” (p. 159).
Indeed, on January 30, Prime Minister Simitis was handed, but “seemed uninterested” in, a personal letter from CIA Director George Tenet. It had been passed on to NIS Director Leonidas Vasikiopoulos from the Athens CIA station chief. The letter stated Tenet’s view that “it would be disastrous for Greece, Turkey and NATO if war broke out due to escalation of the [Imia] incident” (p. 159).
Introduction
The author, Greek historian Panagiotis
Dimitrakis, starts his study with an introduction discussing themes like
‘key concepts in military intelligence,’ ‘leadership and intelligence’
and ‘intelligence and crisis management.’ This is a rather theoretical
approach, but unquestionably it elucidates topics that are crucial to
the narrative of both the 1987 and 1996 events, and thus informs the
rest of the text.
The introduction also gives a broad overview of the following six chapters which constitute the bulk of Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent.
Readers are thus made aware from the beginning of the overarching
structure of the narrative, which fleshes out the concepts discussed in
the introduction. Thus the book is of value both in the specific context
of Greece and Turkey in the late 20th century, and in the
general context of military intelligence and diplomacy at work.
Conclusions can thus be applied or at least compared to other similar
situations from elsewhere in the world. Indeed, the forward to Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent is written by Sir Lawrence Freedman, Britain’s Official Historian of the Falklands War....
more:
http://www.defencegreece.com/index.php/2012/07/review-greek-military-intelligence-and-the-crescent-2/
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