May 14, 2024
Another conflict is emerging in the Western Balkans and it revolves around North Macedonia. The election of a nationalist government in Skopje is likely to sharpen disputes with several neighbors, especially Bulgaria and Greece, and provide new opportunities and inroads for Russia’s subversion and destabilization.
The “Your Macedonia” coalition led by VMRO-DPMNE won just over 43% of the votes in parliamentary elections on 8th May, gaining 58 out of 120 seats. The presidential race was also won by the VMRO-backed candidate Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova, with overwhelming 65% support. VMRO will need three more seats to form an outright parliamentary majority and will be seeking a suitable coalition partner. The Albanian Democratic Union of Integration (DUI) with 19 seats and the Albanian Vlen party with 13 seats are possible coalition candidates, unless VMRO decides that it no longer needs an Albanian partner. If the large Albanian population feels excluded from government decision-making, then tensions will soar in the country.
The dispute with Bulgaria is most likely to escalate, as VMRO will vehemently resist Sofia’s demands that North Macedonia change its constitution and recognize a Bulgarian ethnic minority. VMRO fears that such a step could potentially divide the country and weaken Macedonian identity. The outgoing Social Democrats and the major Albanian parties agreed to such changes, but VMRO views this as unacceptable “Bulgaria’s diktat.” Skopje will also petition the EU to persuade Bulgaria to lift its veto on North Macedonia joining the Union.
However, Bulgaria also faces parliamentary elections in June. The Macedonian question could be stirred by nationalists to publicly challenge the distinct identity, language, nationhood, and history of Macedonians. To distract attention from its failure to rid the country of corruption and Russia’s destructive inroads, another government coalition led by Prime Minister Boyko Borisov can appeal to nationalist sentiments. It will claim that Bulgarian history and identity are being stolen by Skopje who prevents their population from defining themselves as Bulgarian. It may also put pressure on the VMRO government to admit that part of Macedonian history is actually Bulgarian. And it will prolong the blockage of Macedonia’s accession into the EU.
Macedonian-Greek relations can equally deteriorate, as the incoming VMRO government does not recognize the Prespa accords of 2018 in which the country became officially recognized as North Macedonia and Athens unblocked its road to NATO membership. President Siljanovska-Davkova has claimed that the agreement with Greece was adopted in violation of national law. But any attempts to revise the agreement or to discard its stipulations will heat up tensions between Skopje and Athens and convince Greece to block Macedonia’s progress toward EU membership. This will generate further domestic tensions between the government and the Albanian population who do not want to be left stranded in an isolated Macedonia.
Russia has thus far been unsuccessful in capitalizing on any disputes over Macedonia, but will now obtain several avenues for its pernicious interventions. It will court the VMRO government as a Slavic Orthodox vanguard that needs to forge closer relations with its Russian brothers. Moscow will also play a role in Bulgaria’s June elections through its corrupt connections with several politicians and parties and by inciting ethnic tensions through the media, social networks, friendship societies, and the Orthodox Church.
The Kremlin will pursue at least three of its Balkan objectives by capitalizing on Macedonia’s neighborhood rivalries. First, Skopje’s disputes will assist Serbia’s expansionist agenda by diverting Western attention toward conflicts that could involve two EU and NATO states – Bulgaria and Greece.
Second, it can support both Macedonian and Bulgarian nationalisms against allegedly pernicious Western liberal influences and pose as the protector of nationality, traditionalism, and sovereignty in both states. It could even offer to be a mediator between Skopje and Sofia if any dispute threatens to spiral out of control and further inject itself into regional diplomacy.
And third, Moscow can intensify its disinformation offensive against the alleged Albanian and Muslim menace in Macedonia through the local media and social networks and whip up ethnic animosities. Moreover, if Prishtina is drawn into disputes with Skopje, it will become even more vulnerable to Belgrade’s destabilization. In sum, the results of the Macedonian elections can provide a bonanza for Russia in its war against the West and its allies.
Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His recent book is Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture. His new book published in the fall is titled Pivotal Poland: Europe’s Rising Power.
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